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Abstract
This report explores the political history, property rights, and
administrative politics of the land tenure reform process to ask why the Crown
has paid farmers millions of dollars to convert land from leasehold to freehold.
Since 1992, runholders have received collectively 58% (or 165,446 hectares)
of the reformed pastoral estate as fee-simple, and $15.5 million.  The report
documents the results of research in the South Island of New Zealand during
Fulbright grant year 2004-05.
Land tenure reform is a process of dividing up the Crown pastoral
estate into freehold and public conservation land.  The pastoral estate
constitutes about one-tenth of NZ’s landmass.  The Crown holds all 2.4 million
hectares of the pastoral estate; and it has alienated, or leased out, certain use
rights to the lessees.  Now the Crown is in the process of purchasing pastoral
and occupation use rights and land improvements back from the lessee, on
the hectares shifting into DOC custody.  And the lessees are in the process of
purchasing a whole bundle of Crown-held use rights on the hectares passing
to freehold.  This Crown-held bundle of use rights includes subdivision,
condominium construction, ski field development, viticulture, safari park
development, and automobile tyre testing centre development.  The Crown-
held bundle even includes such mundane use rights as planting grass seeds
without prior consent of the Commissioner of Crown Lands.
Chapter 2 deconstructs the numerical results – hectares and dollars –
of the land reform policy endeavour so far, and reveals that these numbers
are contested.  Quite simply, it depends on what you count and how you count
them.  And those methodological counting decisions, while appearing dry and
clinical, most certainly are not.  Numbers are the stuff of public policy,  and
decisions on how to count them are the stuff of politics.  Further, the number
of hectares is misleading, as it is use rights being exchanged here, not the
hectares themselves.
Chapter 3, “Interest Groups, Property Rights, and States’ Rights: The
Sagebrush Rebellion and New Zealand Land Tenure Reform”, examines the
political history of South Island public grazing land, from first establishment of
pastoral licenses in 1856 to the 1998 passage of legislation governing the
disestablishment of the pastoral lease system.  It takes a comparative
perspective, using the Sagebrush Rebellion launched by ranchers in the
American West as a lens.  It concludes that NZ farmers’ push for freehold
succeeded while the American ranchers’ campaign failed, for three reasons:
1) property rights arrangements in NZ pastoral leases allow lessees to
exclude recreationists and other trespassers, while not in the US; 2) the lack
of legally-sanctioned reliable recreation access and conservation provisions in
the leases led NZ’s most prominent conservation and recreation advocacy
groups to join the farmers’ campaign for land tenure reform, while similar US
groups opposed the Sagebrush Rebellion; 3) NZ farmers were able to use
administrative and institutional momentum from the state sector reforms of the
1980s in their campaign for reform.
Next chapter 4, “Trading Sticks with the Crown:  Redistributing Property
Rights to Effect Land Use Change” explores the current distribution and
redistribution of property rights in the Crown pastoral estate, in order to
examine the merits of using property rights as a tool to create land use
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change.  It deconstructs property rights arrangements in pastoral leases into
their constituent parts and finds that there is some uncertainty surrounding the
relationship between the lessee-held exclusive occupation right and the
Crown-held non-pastoral use rights.  It concludes that this uncertainty is a
matter to be addressed by the Courts, not by government contractors or even
government officials.  Finally, it offers alternative policy tools to achieve the
desired changes in land use with an eye to reducing the cost to the
government.
The last chapter, “Who is sticking up for the Crown? The myth of
apolitical administration in New Zealand land tenure reform” evaluates the
results of land reform on the national scale by looking at the administrative
politics within the process managed by Land Information New Zealand (LINZ).
It observes that the numerical results of tenure review are strongly biased in
favor of the farmer, with the farmers receiving 58% of the land as freehold, fee
simple private property, and receiving millions of dollars in "equalization
payments".  It concludes that LINZ’s subscription to the myth of apolitical
administration is leading the agency that represents the Crown’s vested
interest in the land to take a position of neutrality in negotiations instead of
one of advocacy.  LINZ relies on a functional split between policy and
operations, which in turn relies on the oldest trick in the book of public
administration – the politics-administration dichotomy.  These two models
share a common goal – avoiding agency capture in policy implementation –
and administrative tool – neutrality.
But in this case, striving for neutrality is neutralizing the Crown’s vested
interest in the land.  LINZ cannot be neutral and advocate for the Crown’s
interest at the same time.  Thus over-reliance on the myth of apolitical
administration is leading to a result that out-captures agency capture theories
of interest group politics
This report does not paint a rosy picture of land tenure reform.  It
concludes that the myth of apolitical administration supercedes interest group
politics and property rights, and leads the Crown to take a neutral stance in
the face of powerful special interests motivated to diversify land use, be it for
venison farming, viticulture, or lifestyle blocks.
It is impossible to remove politics from inherently political decisions
such as redistributing valuable resources.  And it can be a dangerous
endeavor.  In this case, striving for neutrality in order to achieve a fair,
unbiased, and uncaptured result is doomed to fail on all counts, no matter how
well-intentioned the attempt.
The Crown is asserting neither its property rights nor its bargaining
powers.   Instead, the Crown's position of neutrality leads it to give away
valuable property rights and pay constituents to take it.  In short, the myth of
apolitical administration makes the Crown complicit giving away freehold title
to New Zealand's iconic high country, and paying the lease-holders to take it.
To sum up, the politics of land tenure reform remain win-win as long as
the Crown agrees to lose.  This is not an indictment of LINZ.  I have no data to
support a claim that the agency’s attempts at neutrality are anything but
honest, competent, and well-intentioned.  But placing “neutral” and “vested
interest” in the same task description will not work.  One will lose.  In this
case, it is the vested interest, the Crown, and ultimately the NZ people.
Brower Fulbright Report 4
Acknowledgements
All scholars seek to stand on the shoulders of giants in their work.  I am
proud to stand on several, even if one of them has a very bad back. Mentors
and friends at Berkeley, Yale, and Pomona College shaped me, my research
questions, and means of finding answers more than they know.  Most
especially, my PhD supervisor Sally Fairfax and her bad back undergird
everything.   Though she taught me everything about US public land politics
and nothing about NZ, somehow her critical eye is omnipresent in my work.
Sally and her protégés as well as Todd LaPorte, Joseph Sax, Bob Kagan,
Keith Gilless, Louise Fortmann, Chris Ansell, Jonah Levy, and many others at
Berkeley taught me volumes about how to look at NZ.  But all errors are of
course mine.
I also thank many academics who have read and commented on various
drafts and parts of this report, especially Ton Buhrs, Kevin O’Connor, Kay
Booth, and Jean McFarlane at Lincoln.   Further afield from Lincoln, I thank
Phil Meguire and Alfred Guender in the economics department at Canterbury
for their help with the numbers, and David Grinlinton at U Auckland Law
School for his help with NZ land law.  And more distant but ever-present, I
thank Gregg Cawley at U Wyoming, Leigh Raymond at Purdue, Sally at
Berkeley, Kevin Eddings at Yale, and my longsuffering but ever-cheerful
parents, LouAnn and the other David Brower.  How my flatmates put up with
me and my horrific cooking on my Fulbright year is a mystery, but I thank
them heartily.  Finally, I thank the small but engaging audience of 4.7 for their
valuable feedback when I presented an early version of this research at
Pomona College in California
And then there’s Fulbright.  This project bears little resemblance to that
which I proposed almost two years ago now.  My original project sounded
fascinating on paper, or at least good enough for a Fulbright.  But on arrival I
quickly learned that New Zealand is not the US, and what is fascinating in
America may well be irrelevant here.  I have great respect for Fulbright-NZ for
encouraging me to study what is most interesting, not necessarily sticking
doggedly to that which I set out to do.
It is with great sadness that I end my year as a Fulbright grantee.
When I received the award, I was flushed with the honor.  But when I met my
fellow Fulbright colleagues I realized the magnitude of the Fulbright, and
became awed by the honor.  I am continually blown away by their creativity,
intellectual engagement, and resourcefulness.  And the more I read about the
Fulbrighters who have come before us, the smile fades and is replaced by a
glow.  For many years I have been surrounded by supreme talent at Yale,
Berkeley, and Pomona College.  But somehow Fulbrighters are different.
Somehow they stand out in the crowd of scholars.  I am awed to be in their
company.  Albeit mystifying, it is an unspeakable honour to call myself one of
them.
Brower Fulbright Report 5
Table of Contents
Abstract ..........................................................................................................2
Acknowledgements .......................................................................................4
List of Tables and Figures.............................................................................7
Chapter 1  Introduction .................................................................................8
Overview of report ........................................................................................9
Chapter 2 Research Design, Methods, and the Politics of Numerical Data
.......................................................................................................................12
Research design and methods...................................................................12
A note about numbers and politics..........................................................14
More on numbers: it’s use rights, not hectares .......................................20
And finally: it’s qualitative, not quantitative..............................................20
Chapter 3 Interest Groups, Property Rights, and States’ Rights: The
Sagebrush Rebellion and New Zealand Land Tenure Reform .................22
Introduction ................................................................................................22
What are pastoral leases?..........................................................................23
Beginning of the end of NZ pastoral leases and US federal lands? ...........26
NZ Institutional Reforms .........................................................................27
1980s: Push for tenure reform from all sides ..........................................30
Recreation – conservation join crusade for land reform..........................31
Lack of Recreation Access Sparks Support for Reform..........................32
Administrative lead-up to tenure review..................................................34
Land tenure reform under the Land Act: 1991 – 1998 ............................37
The End of the Road: Introduction of the Crown Pastoral Land Bill ........38
Discussion and Conclusion ........................................................................39
Chapter 4 Trading Sticks with the Crown:  Redistributing Property
Rights to Effect Land Use Change .............................................................42
Introduction ................................................................................................42
The mechanics of distribution and redistribution of property rights ............46
Crown land, alienation, and the current distribution of property rights ....48
Valuation of the Crown's financial interest:  The Emmerson case ..........55
Trading Sticks with the Crown: Land Tenure Reform as Exchange of Use
Rights .........................................................................................................57
Results of Land Tenure Reform – Is the redistribution changing land use?59
Brower Fulbright Report 6
Results of Land Tenure Reform – At what cost?........................................59
Policy alternatives and the role of the Court...............................................63
Conclusion .................................................................................................67
Chapter 5 Who is sticking up for the Crown? The myth of apolitical
administration in New Zealand land tenure reform...................................69
Introduction ................................................................................................69
Background ................................................................................................73
The politics-administration dichotomy in land reform: LINZ as neutral
referee........................................................................................................76
It’s consultation, not negotiation .................................................................82
Hang on, What about DOC? ......................................................................86
Result of Dichotomy:  No one sticking up for the Crown.........................89
Discussion..................................................................................................89
Conclusion .................................................................................................95
Works Cited..................................................................................................98
Brower Fulbright Report 7
List of Tables and Figures
Figure 1: The pastoral estate between Wanaka and Mt Aspiring National Park.
..................................................................................................................8
Figure 2: Mount Pisa Station lifestyle blocks for sale, northeast of Wanaka,
New Zealand.............................................................................................8
Table 1: Research methods and data sources...............................................13
Table 2: Timeline of Land Tenure Reform in New Zealand............................25
Figure 3: Land use change following land tenure reform.  Part of the land in
this estate winery came out of Mt Difficulty Station, the first lease to
undergo land tenure reform.  Felton Road winery, near Bannockburn,
Central Otago, NZ...................................................................................41
Figure 4: Trampers descending a foothill of the Southern Alps, Canterbury,
New Zealand...........................................................................................41
Figure 5: Lake Hawea, with Dingleburn Station on right-hand shoreline.  Near
Wanaka, Lakes District, New Zealand.  After the change in land tenure,
the former pastoral  leasehold is now a patchwork mosaic of public and
private land.  Very roughly, land below the snow line is now private; land
above is managed by DOC. Dingleburn is an exceptional case, by virtue
of its size (23,000 ha) and the large portion transferred to DOC (70.6%).
Despite the latter, recreationists must now traverse nearly 10km of
recently privatized land before reaching the public recreation land
beyond. ...................................................................................................43
Table 3: Uses contained in the two bundles under the Land Act, subject to
Resource Management Act ....................................................................58
Table 4: Equalization Payments (in NZ$000) 1992 - 2005.............................61
Figure 6: Empirical valuation of newly freeholded pastoral land: 8ha for
$320,000 near Wanaka. .........................................................................68
Figure 7: Public recreation access to new conservation reserve across 1.6 km
of newly freeholded land.  Down a long, bumpy dirt road, through two
herds of sheep, somewhere in Central Otago, NZ..................................96
Figure 8: New conservation land resulting from land tenure reform.  Lindis
Pass Conservation Area, August 2005. ..................................................96
Figure 9: Designation Plan for the "Lindis Group" of pastoral leases.............97
Brower Fulbright Report 8
Chapter 1  Introduction
There is something different about the light
in New Zealand’s high country.1  It makes the
details of topography so crisp as to appear
fake, or somehow artificially enhanced.  On a
clear day in Wanaka, it is easy to think you
have just stepped out of Plato’s cave.  It is as
if you have spent your whole life experiencing
the world in two dimensions or in black and
white, and now the world suddenly has three
dimensions, in Technicolor.
And
on a cloudy day in the Crown Range,
Aslan and his Narnian compatriots are
surely not far away.
Figure 1: The pastoral estate between
Wanaka and Mt Aspiring National Park.
But the high country
landscapes are changing –
from pastoral sheep farming
to viticulture, from broad
expanses of Crown land to
private “slices of heaven,”2
and from extreme
remoteness to Xtreme™
snowboarding.
Figure 2: Mount Pisa Station lifestyle blocks for sale, northeast of Wanaka, New
Zealand.
                                           
1 “high country” is defined as land above 550m.
2 Called lifestyle blocks in New Zealand, and ranchettes in California. See Figure 6.
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Since 1992, the Crown has conveyed freehold, fee-simple, title to about
58% of the reformed pastoral estate to farmers, retaining 42% in full Crown
ownership to be managed for conservation and recreation.  With the 1998
passage of the Crown Pastoral Land Act, or CPLA, Parliament gave legal
sanction to the land tenure reform process.  The reform process is managed
by the government agency Land Information New Zealand, or LINZ, with
much of the technical operations performed by professional contractors.
When the land reverts to the Crown, it shifts into the management of the
Department of Conservation, or DOC, steward of about one third of New
Zealand’s landmass.  That farmers would get more land than the Crown3 in a
negotiation is not surprising.  Both theories of public choice and agency
capture would predict this outcome.
What is more surprising, and not predicted by models of interest group
politics, is that the Crown has paid farmers NZ$15.5 million.  This report
documents the results of an exploration in land tenure reform on the South
Island of New Zealand during Fulbright grant year 2004-05.  It explores the
political history, property rights, and administrative politics of the land tenure
reform process to ask why the Crown has paid farmers millions of dollars to
convert land from leasehold to freehold.
Overview of report
Chapter 2 outlines the research design and methods, and offers an
important deconstruction of the politics of the quantitative data used in this
report.  Chapter 3 examines the political history of South Island public grazing
land, from first establishment of pastoral licenses in 1856 to the 1998 passage
of legislation governing the disestablishment of the pastoral lease system.  It
takes a comparative perspective, using the Sagebrush Rebellion launched by
ranchers in the American West as a lens.  It concludes that NZ farmers’ push
for freehold succeeded while the American ranchers’ campaign failed for three
                                           
3 Statisticians might wonder if these 2 columns of data with such high variability are
actually different.  Statistically, are the farmers getting more?  Yes.  A 2-tailed t-test of
statistical significance reveals a p-value of .0075, indicating that the two columns of numbers
(to DOC and to freehold) are statistically different, and indicating that the 58-42 split is indeed
statistically different from a 50-50 split.  And a similar t-test of the proportional splits
(%freehold and %DOC) yields an even stronger p-value of approximately 0.00000000125.  In
other words, this is not a fluke, but a pattern.
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reasons: 1) property rights arrangements in NZ pastoral leases allow lessees
to exclude recreationists and other trespassers, while not in the US; 2) the
lack of legally-sanctioned reliable recreation access and conservation
provisions in the leases led NZ’s most prominent conservation and recreation
advocacy groups to join the farmers’ campaign for land tenure reform, while
similar US groups opposed the Sagebrush Rebellion; 3) NZ farmers were able
to use administrative and institutional momentum from the state sector
reforms of the 1980s in their campaign for reform.
Next chapter 4 explores the current distribution and redistribution of
property rights in the Crown pastoral estate, in order to examine the merits of
using property rights as tool to create land use change.  It uses an abstract
theory of property as a bundle of rights, rather than a thing in itself.  Borrowing
from scholarship on natural resource usufructuary rights in the US, it
deconstructs property rights arrangements in pastoral leases into their
constituent parts and finds that there is some uncertainty surrounding the
relationship between the lessee-held exclusive occupation right and the
Crown-held non-pastoral use rights.  It concludes that this uncertainty is a
matter to be addressed by the Courts, not by government contractors or even
government officials.  Finally, it offers a few alternative policy tools to achieve
the desired changes in land use with an eye to reducing the cost to the
government.
The last chapter evaluates the results of land reform on the national
scale.  It observes that the numerical results of tenure review are strongly
biased in favor of the farmer, with the farmers receiving 58% of the land as
freehold, fee simple private property, and receiving millions of dollars in
"equalization payments".  It concludes that LINZ's subscription to the myth of
apolitical administration is leading the Crown agency that represents the
Crown’s vested interest in the land to take a position of neutrality in
negotiations instead of one of advocacy.  LINZ relies on a functional split
between policy and operations, which in turn relies on the oldest trick in the
book of public administration, the politics-administration dichotomy.  These
two models share a common goal – avoiding agency capture in policy
implementation – and administrative tool – neutrality.  But in this case, striving
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for neutrality is neutralizing the Crown’s vested interest in the land.  LINZ
cannot be neutral and advocate for the Crown’s interest at the same time.
Thus over-reliance on the myth of administrative neutrality is leading to a
result that out-captures agency capture theories of interest group politics.
This report does not paint a rosy picture of land tenure reform.  It
concludes that the myth of apolitical administration supercedes interest group
politics and property rights, and leads the Crown to take a neutral stance in
the face of powerful special interests motivated to diversify land use, be it for
venison farming, viticulture, or lifestyle blocks.
It is impossible to remove politics from inherently political decisions
such as redistributing valuable resources.  And it can be a dangerous
endeavour.  In this case, striving for neutrality in order to achieve a fair,
unbiased, and uncaptured result is doomed to fail on both counts, no matter
how well-intentioned the attempt.  The Crown is asserting neither its property
rights nor its bargaining powers.   Instead, the Crown's position of neutrality
leads it to give away land title and pay constituents to take it.  In short, the
myth of apolitical administration makes the Crown complicit giving away
freehold title to New Zealand's iconic high country, and paying the lessees to
take it.
To sum up, the politics of land tenure reform remain win-win as long as
the Crown continues to lose.
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Chapter 2
Research Design, Methods, and the Politics of Numerical Data
Research design and methods
The research scale, scope, and methods were designed around the
character and availability of data about the land tenure reform process and
results.  Land reform is a controversial business.  The only relatively
uncontested information is the results -- the number of hectares allocated for
conservation and for freehold, and the aggregate number of dollars
exchanged between lessees and the Crown.  Hence this is a results based
analysis, starting with the end of the story, so far, and identifying themes and
patterns in the story, the political process, that explain the results.  The “so
far” represents an important caveat of the sample size of the results to date.
Thirteen years into the program, just over 20% of the total population of
leases have completed the reform.
There are two forms of results data, hectares and dollars, publicly
available on different scales.  The number of hectares designated to freehold
and to full Crown ownership is available on a micro scale, for each farm that
has undergone reform.  The amount of money exchanged between lessees
and the Crown is only available in LINZ annual reports.4  Hence this data is
available only at the macro scale, in aggregated form.  As such, the research
is on a macro scale.5
Research to identify elements of the process that led to the results
followed a triangulation design, but again tailored the research methodology to
the character and availability of data sources.  Table 1 lists the data sources
and methods employed in this research.
The land tenure reform process takes place behind closed doors,
involving government contractors, the lessee, government officials, and other
                                           
4 According to LINZ officials, the amount of money exchanged on each farm is
classified as confidential in order to protect the privacy of personal family finances.
5 It does not examine the qualitative peculiarities of each of the leases that have
signed agreements, distributed land, and received equalization payments.  Rather, it looks at
aggregate results on a national level.  It does not re-examine the assessment of conservation
or production values that led to a particular designation of land.  Nor does it examine the
valuation of property interests.  In short, it takes the results as given, and looks of the politics
of the negotiation process of that led to the result.
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interested parties who are invited to participate in the consultation process.
As it is a closed process, the only available data on the process itself is
secondary data -- interviews, government documents, media accounts, and
legal analysis.  It is important to note that this research was conducted on a
Fulbright grant, by a visiting American researcher new to New Zealand.  As
such, the data was gathered through foreign eyes, ears, and perspective.
Cognizant of the culturally and politically loaded topic of land valuation and
ownership, my foreign status, and the secondary character of the available
data on the political process, I took the data at face value -- uncritically and
perhaps optimistically.  For example, when government officials reported that
they were neutral, making decisions in an objective and unbiased manner, I
believed that they made good-faith efforts to remain neutral despite the
weighty theory and literature that assert that such neutrality is impossible. In
other words, as a foreign Fulbrighter attempting to adopt the humility and
open-mindedness of Candide, I gave interviewees the benefit of the doubt no
matter how substantial the doubt.
Table 1: Research methods and data sources
Methods Data sources
two tailed t-test of
statistical
significance
number of hectares designated
amount of money exchanged (from LINZ, DOC,
and www.linz.govt.nz)
semi-structured
key informant
interviews
Government officials
Contractors
interest groups staff and volunteers
lessees
advocates for lessees
academics
interested observers of the process
document review Cabinet papers
LINZ policy papers
DOC policy papers
public submissions on CPLA and individual land
tenure reform deals
policy papers of interest groups (farmers,
recreation, and conservation)
discourse analysis 1992-2005 land reform articles in The
Christchurch Press,
and The Otago Daily Times
1980-2005 land reform articles in Federated
Mountain Clubs Bulletin and Forest and Bird
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legal analysis Crown Pastoral Land Act (CPLA) of 1998
CPLA legislative history (materials in the
Parliamentary Library, Wellington; interviews
with 1990s policymakers)
Land Act of 1948
Cabinet papers
observational
landscape analysis
Photographs of changing land use in the Lakes
District surrounding Queenstown and
Wanaka, among the first leases to undergo
land tenure reform in 1990s (and a few 1980s
attempts)
A note about numbers and politics
But exactly how “uncontested” are these data measuring policy results
to date?  Even numbers are far from uncontested data, as counting is an
inherently political process (Stone, 2001).  Though they convey a message of
authority and precisions, many numbers are far from authoritative and precise
– most especially in a controversial political process like the redistribution of
property rights.  Quite simply, it depends on what you count and how you
count them.  And those methodological counting decisions, while appearing
dry and clinical, most certainly are not.  Numbers are the stuff of public policy,
decisions on how to count them are the stuff of politics.  According to Stone
(2001, p 184, 185), numbers “tend to imply certain solutions to a problem, so
people who have particular solutions to peddle will promote the measures that
point to their solutions. … [Numbers in politics] are not only strategically
selected but strategically presented as well.  Numbers never stand by
themselves in policy debates; they are clothed in words and symbols and
carried in narrative stories.”
Decisions about what to include in and exclude from a sum of numbers
are strategic, and can garner or lose support for a policy.  According to Stone:
Counting must begin with with categorization, which in turn means
deciding whether to include or exclude. … Categorization thus involves
the establishment of boundaries in the form of rules or criteria tat tell
whether something belongs or not. … To categorize in counting … is to
select one feature of something, assert a likeness on the basis of that
feature, and ignore all the other features.  To count is to form a
category by emphasizing some feature instead of others and excluding
things that might be similar in important ways but do not share that
feature. … Every number is a political claim about ‘where to draw the
line.’  Projections, correlations, … and other fancy manipulations of
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numbers [not to mention p-values!] all rest on the decisions about
‘counting as’ embodied in their numbers, so they, too, are claims about
similarities and differences.  And similarities and differences are the
ultimate basis for decisions in public policy. (Stone, 2001 pp. 164,165,
167)
This strategic maneuvering around numbers is not unique to the right or the
left.  It occurs in all parties, all allegiances, and all policy debates.
While appearing clear and incontrovertible, numbers can mystify and
even obscure.  As such, they deserve careful scrutiny and as much
deconstruction as possible.  Let us take a February 2005 Cabinet policy
summary document on the progress towards the government’s High Country
Objectives, excerpted below.  The operative numbers in this summary are
listed in the second paragraph: 66 leases finished, 94,500 hectares to Crown,
and 93,500 to freehold; while the numbers that qualify the operatives are
listed in the first paragraph -- 2 policy tools, 10 objectives.  Let us quickly
deconstruct the operative numbers in light of their qualifiers, in the hopes of
clarifying the source of the numbers for this Fulbright report.  From page 1:
Reading page 1, it appears that land reform is yielding equal amounts
of land for conservation as for freehold.  But the very first operative number (2
policy tools) qualifies the apparently equal 93,500 – 94,500 split in the second
paragraph.  Though technically accurate, this even split conflates the results
of the land tenure reform policy tool with the un-named Nature Heritage Fund
(NHF), which acquires land and land interests for conservation, and is not
described in the Cabinet document until page 3.  Page 3 specifies that NHF
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lease purchases account for 45,500 hectares.  Does this matter?  In a word,
absolutely.  Page 3:
This Fulbright report focuses on percentages and proportions (of land
to DOC and to freehold) that result from land tenure reform.  Including NHF
purchases in the summary totals drastically changes the proportion of land
returning to the Crown.  With the NHF purchases included, the proportion of
land types exchanged looks like an even split of 49.7% to freehold and 50.3%
to DOC.  Excluding NHF purchases from these numbers paints a different
picture, far less favourable to conservation: 65.4% to freehold and 34.6% to
DOC.  Again while not disingenuous, this method of counting is confusing at
best and misleading at worst.
Then there are the 66 leases.  How are they counted, and how are their
hectares accounted for?  Should we include data only from reforms completed
after passage of enabling legislation in 1998?  Or should we include reforms
that took place between 1992 and 1998 in an administrative process under
the Land Act?  This Cabinet paper has a confusing way of counting leases.  It
says that 66 have undergone reform, but only seems to list the hectares
exchanged in the reforms after 1998.  According to a government document
attached to this Cabinet paper, 36 leases underwent reform between 1992
and 1998,6 though the Christchurch Press counts only 34 (Hayman 2003).
Relying on DOC numbers I count only 35 leases completed from 1992-1998,
of which 107,855 hectares (or 59%) were converted from pastoral lease to
freehold.  And 75,610 hectares (or 41%) passed from pastoral lease to full
Crown ownership under DOC management.  By the Christchurch Press’s
count though, only “about 40%” converted from pastoral to DOC prior to
CPLA.7
                                           
6 as reported on page 1 of a report back document attached to the Cabinet paper (at
http://www.linz.govt.nz/docs/crownproperty/cabinet_policy_south_island_objectives.pdf)
7 Kamala Hayman, "Tenure Tensions," The Press, 22 November 2003 2003.
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Though the pre-1998 leases are included in the number (66) having
undergone reform, this front page summary of achievement of high country
objectives does not seem to account for the pre-CPLA leases’ 180,000
hectares.  Does inclusion of hectares exchanged prior to 1998 change the
proportions of interest to this report?  Well it depends on to which numbers
they are compared.
By my estimation, the most comprehensive, inclusive, and forthright
counting methodology is to include all leases, all hectares,8 and all dollars
exchanged in land tenure reform both before and after 1998.  And an
evaluation of land tenure reform would only count results from that policy, not
from the Nature Heritage Fund.  So a count that includes both pre- and post-
CPLA exchanges,9 and excludes hectares purchased by NHF yields the
following totals: 178,288 hectares (or 61%) to freehold; and 114,013 hectares
(or 39%) to DOC.  61-39 looks very different from 50-50, and has very
different implications for the future of land policy.
So there is potential for seeing 30, 34, 35, 36, or 66 leases completed,
with a split of 50-50,10 65-35,11 61-39,12 59-41,13 or 60-40.14  These are all
perfectly logical conclusions from published numbers, but each leads to a
different answer to the question “how are we going with land tenure reform?”
And then there is the money.  Nowhere does this summary of policy
results list the cost of this policy.  Nowhere does it say how much the lessees
are paying the Crown for their collective 61% share, nor how much the Crown
is paying the lessees to buy out their collective property interests.  The
                                           
8 And if possible, the number of hectares should be counted after performing the final
survey.  But regardless of survey timing, if the summary of results includes the pre-1998 lease
numbers, it certainly must include their hectares.
9 In this count, I use the post-CPLA hectares counted by the Cabinet document
(94,500) minus the NHF purchases as reported on p. 3 (45,500), plus hectares transferred to
DOC pre-CPLA
10 Described on page 1 of Cabinet Policy Committee, "South Island High Country
Objectives," (Wellington: Cabinet Office, 2005)..
11 From page 1, but excluding the Nature Heritage Fund purchases described on
page 3.
12 Counting pre-CPLA results + post-CPLA results reported on page 1 – NHF
purchases.
13 Pre-CPLA results.
14 Admittedly, this is probably just a case of rounding down by the popular media.
Hayman, "Tenure Tensions."
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individual financial agreements are classified as confidential under §9(2)(a) of
the Official Information Act 1982, to “protect the commercial position of the
person … who is the subject of the information.”15  Those individual numbers
are sealed, and unpublished in the media.  The cumulative numbers are
available in the LINZ annual reports by fiscal year (see chapter 4).  But they
still remain all but unpublished in the media.  In politics information is power.
Control of the measurement and release of information is strategy.
The numbers I use in this report are accurate to my best endeavour.  I
collated them from spreadsheets mailed to me by LINZ and DOC staff in
Dunedin, Christchurch, and Wellington, and from substantive proposal
summary documents published on the web at www.linz.govt.nz.  I do not
include Nature Heritage Fund purchases in my data, unless it is somehow
included in spreadsheet data without my knowledge.  I use aggregate
numbers for each lease:  the total number of hectares transferred to DOC,
even if a significant portion has been leased back to the lessee for grazing;
and the total number of hectares converted to freehold, even if a conservation
covenant restricts development on a large portion of it.  Finally, I count the
hectares with regard for the fiscal year.  As the dollar results are grouped by
fiscal year, so will I group the hectare results.  As such, the numbers I use
include only the deals signed on or before 30 June 2005 because the dollar
results end on that date as well.
This grouping by fiscal year brings up one last point about strategies
and counting.  Just as charitable contributions rise at the end of a tax year,
government budgets and implementation patterns sometimes revolve around
the end of the fiscal year.  Witness the pattern of hectares distribution from the
end of FY04-05, and how it differs to the distribution at the beginning of FY05-
06.
                                           
15 Letter (ref: 20050284) to author from Treasury regarding Official Information Act
request.
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% of pastoral land passed to freehold just before and just after 30 June, 2005 (end of 
FY05)
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percentages to freehold
Date
completed
Ha to
freehold16
Ha to
DOC
% to
freehold % to DOC
07-May-
04 775 2070 27.2% 72.8%
10-Jan-05 4230 3645 53.7% 46.3%
28-Jan-05 3088 447 87.4% 12.6%
02-Feb-05 1593 3206 33.2% 66.8%
02-Feb-05 111 992 10.1% 89.9%
24-Feb-05 161 26.695 85.8% 14.2%
19-May-
05 7013 16,874 29.4% 70.6%
01-Jun-05 2556 9367 21.4% 78.6%
30-Jun-05 9216 5843 61.2% 38.8%
END OF FY 05
11-Aug-05 6029.824 407 93.7% 6.3%
19-Aug-05 761.3 117.5 86.6% 13.4%
30-Aug-05 3523 396 89.9% 10.1%
16-Sep-05 1647 1186.205 58.1% 41.9%
11-Oct-05 2711 1619 62.6% 37.4%
12-Oct-05 444 65.58 87.1% 12.9%
12-Oct-05 729 146.1964 83.3% 16.7%
20-Oct-05 not available
04-Nov-05 1278.766 31 97.6% 2.4%
                                           
16 Data in this table obtained from www.linz.govt.nz.
End of FY 05
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18-Nov-
05 not available
More on numbers: it’s use rights, not hectares
Once it is clear which numbers are included, which are not, and how
they are counted, I let us be clear about exactly what is being counted.  We
must also ask whether it can and should be counted?  For “to count
something is … to assert that it is an identifiable entity with clear boundaries.
No one could believe in a count of something that cannot be identified, so to
offer a count is to ask your audience to believe that the thing is countable.”
(Stone, 2001 p. 173)
Though countable, hectares and dollars are not exactly what is being
exchanged in land tenure reform.  As chapter 4 describes in detail, land
tenure reform is not an exchange of hectares, but rather an exchange of use
rights on those hectares.
Let there be no mistake, the Crown holds title to all 2.4 million hectares
of the pastoral estate.  The Crown has held title since the purchases in the
1840s and ’50s, most especially the Kemp’s Deed purchase of 1848.  The
Crown has alienated, or leased out, certain use rights to the lessees.  Now the
Crown is in the process of purchasing pastoral and occupation use rights and
land improvements back from the lessee, on the hectares shifting into DOC
custody.  And the lessees are in the process of purchasing a whole bundle of
Crown-held use rights on the hectares passing to freehold.  As chapter 4
details, this Crown-held bundle of use rights includes subdivision,
condominium construction, ski field development, viticulture, safari park
development, and automobile tyre testing centre development.  The Crown-
held bundle even includes such mundane use rights as irrigation, fencing, and
planting grass without prior consent of the Commissioner of Crown Lands.
And finally: it’s qualitative, not quantitative
It is use rights being exchanged, not hectares.  But use rights are hard
to measure, and cannot be counted.  Hence the research design revolves
around the available data, fallible though they may be.  At its heart, this is a
qualitative study, asking how did we come to arrive at this result?  The
numbers are an indicator of the result so far.  The guts of the research and
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analysis revolve around qualitative data gathering and analysis.
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Chapter 3
Interest Groups, Property Rights, and States’ Rights:
The Sagebrush Rebellion and New Zealand Land Tenure
Reform
Introduction
This chapter presents the political lead-up to land tenure reform
through the lens of similar efforts in the United States.  It asks why New
Zealand farmers successfully attained freehold rights to pastoral land, while
American ranchers were not successful in their 1960s-1980s campaign to
transfer title to grazing land from the federal government to the states.  Both
campaigns sought to devolve authority over public land, though the NZ
campaign sought to devolve it further.  The chapter concludes that differences
in property rights arrangements led to near universal support for NZ land
reform, and staunch opposition from the environmental interest groups in the
US.
In the 1960s, a group of ranchers in the western U.S. launched the
Sagebrush Rebellion, a political movement which pushed for, among other
things, devolution of authority to the Western public grazing land under
grazing permits from the federal government to the states.17  At the same time
in New Zealand, South Island “runholders”, or sheep ranchers operating on
pastoral land leased from the Crown, had been pushing sporadically for
decades for an affordable way to convert their lease land to “freehold”, fee-
simple private property.18  With some alterations over the years, American
grazing permits are alive and well, still administered by the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM).
But since 1992, New Zealand has been slowly eradicating its pastoral
leases – transferring the title for (mostly lower-elevation, below 1000m) land
“capable of economic use” (Crown Pastoral Land Act, 1998,§24(a)(ii)) to the
                                           
17 They advocated for many other things as well, most notably “States’ Rights,” but
this article focuses on privatization of publicly-owned grazing land.
18 According to former director of the Department of Lands and Survey, pastoral
lessee and former member of Federated Farmers High Country Committee, and former policy
adviser to Parliamentary sponsor of statute governing land reform (CPLA).
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runholders as freehold land, and restoring the land with “significant inherent
values” (Crown Pastoral Land Act, 1998, §24(b)) for conservation, recreation,
heritage, and landscape to “full Crown ownership and control” (Crown
Pastoral Land Act, 1998, §24(b)(ii)) to be managed as parks or reserves by
the Department of Conservation.  In other words, the campaign for land
reform has been successful in New Zealand, but not in the US.
What are pastoral leases?
Pastoral leases are contractual agreements between the Crown as
lessor and the lessee, granted by the Commissioner of Crown Lands under
section 66 of the Land Act of 1948.  The leased land is a type of Crown land
classified as “pastoral”, or "land that is suitable or adaptable primarily for
pastoral purposes only." (Land Act, 1948, §51(1)(d) (Later amended and
repealed by CPLA §104))  Crown land is "vested in her Majesty which is not
for the time being set aside for any public purpose or held by any person in
fee simple." (Land Act, 1948, §2)  In other words, it is neither reserved for a
specific purpose with a public access, nor private property.  With numerous
amendments, including the CPLA of 1998, the Land Act still governs pastoral
leases.
Brooker’s Land Law defines a lease as: “an estate in land.  It may exist
at law or in equity.  It arises when one party, the lessor (or landlord), confers
on another party, the lessee (or tenant), the right to the exclusive possession
of certain land for a period which is subject to a definite limit. … Leases exhibit
both proprietary and contractual characteristics.  The common law originally
recognized the arrangements from which they sprang as merely contractual,
but gradually acknowledged the lessee’s rights to the land which was the
subject of the contract, recognizing, through the remedies available, that the
lessee had rights in rem.” (Brookers Looseleaf Legal Service, 1995, para.
11.1.01)
Pastoral leases administer the distribution of usufructuary property
rights among the leaseholder and the Crown, while the CPLA governs the
redistribution of property rights in land tenure reform.  If we consider the
pastoral leases as a bundle of sticks, each representing a separate
usufructuary property right (or use right), the farmer holds the rights to
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pasturage, perpetual right of renewal,19 exclusive occupation, and ownership
of physical “improvements” to land (Brookers Looseleaf Legal Service, 1995,
para. 11.23.02); and the Crown holds the rights to soil, water, minerals, and all
land uses other than pastoralism (Commissioner of Crown Lands, 1994, p.
12).  The right to exclusive occupation confers upon the farmer the right to
exclude trespassers, including recreationists.  In that sense, then, the farmer
holds the sticks for recreation access, pastoral use, and sale/transfer/bequest
in the property rights bundle.  And the Crown holds the rights to all uses
except pastoralism (subdivision, viticulture, venison farming, ski resorts, soil
disturbance, mining, etc.).
The lessee’s right of exclusive occupation is an important legal right, as
it allows him/her to keep others off the property.
The House of Lords, in Steet v Mountford [1985] AC 809 adopted the
approach that … a grant of exclusive possession was of prime
importance.  Their Lordships [cite] the now classic passage from the
judgement of Windeyer J., at p 222: “What then is a fundamental right
which a tenant has which distinguishes his position from that of a
licensee?  It is an interest in land distinct from a personal permission to
enter the land and use it for some stipuated purpose.  And how is it to
be ascertained whether such an interest in land has been given?  By
seeing whether the grantee was given a legal right of exclusive
possession of the land. … A legal right of exclusive possession is a
tenancy, and the creation of such a right is a demise. … A right of
exclusive possession is secured by the right or a lessee to maintain
ejectment and, after his entry, trespass. (Brookers Looseleaf Legal
Service, 1995, para.11.3.04)
Exclusive occupation is perhaps more important socially than legally, as it
conveys a perception of outright ownership.
Pastoral leases run for 33 years, and are renewable in perpetuity (Land
Act, 1948, §66(2), repealed and replaced by CPLA §4(b)).  These leases are
also fully transferable by sale, gift, or inheritance, contingent on consent of the
                                           
19 It should be noted that a perpetually renewable lease is different from a lease in
perpetuity, which is prohibited in Common Law.  “Truly perpetual leases are not recognized
by the common law. … An attempt to grant such a lease would result in either the grant of
tenancy under s 105 Property Law Act 1952, … or the grant of a fee simple subject to the
payment of an annual rent charge in perpetuity. … The phrase “perpetual lease” is regularly
used to refer to perpetually renewable pastoral leases (and licenses) of Crown Land, granted
under thte Land Act 1948 (1948 No 64).”Brookers Looseleaf Legal Service, "Land Law," ed.
Andrew Alston (Wellington, NZ: Brookers, 1995), para, 11-61.
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Commissioner (Land Act, 1948, §93(1)).  Even Canadian pop star Shania
Twain bought two pastoral leases near Queenstown, New Zealand in 2004.20
Currently there are about 27321 pastoral leases remaining on the
eastern slope of the southern Alps.  As of February 2005, 66 leases had
completed the reform, 154 were in process, and 119 had acted on the
voluntary nature of reforms and chosen not to enter the process.  The leases
range in size from 1000 ha to 16,000 ha, with an average of 7000 ha (Cabinet
Policy Committee, 2005, p. 7).  The pastoral estate supports about 2.8 million
stock units, or about 4% of the total stock in New Zealand.  And pastoral land
produces a large portion of New Zealand's "extra fine” Merino wool.  The land
is quite varied in its pastoral productive capabilities, from the highly productive
low lands up to land above 2000m in altitude with little to no productive
capacity (Commissioner of Crown Lands, 1994, p. 11).
Table 2: Timeline of Land Tenure Reform in New Zealand
1840 Treaty of Waitangi establishes NZ as a colony of Britain
1844-
1864
Crown purchases much of the South Island high country from Maori (Ngai
Tahu) cited in (Brookers Looseleaf Legal Service, 1995, para.11.22.01)
1856-
1858
grazing leases established on South Island (Commissioner of Crown
Lands, 1994) cited in (Brookers Looseleaf Legal Service, 1995,
para.11.22.02) -- pastoral licenses for 1 year in Canterbury and 14 years
in Otago (Broad, no date)
1948 Land Act passes, grants 33 year pastoral leases, renewable in perpetuity.
Leases are fully transferable with Crown permission, and offer exclusive
right of occupation, and right of pasturage (and other non-pastoral uses
with Crown consent)
1948- Farmers sporadically advocate for right to convert lease land to freehold
                                           
20 see for example: Staff, "Twain Purchase Rumour a Worry `Come on over' Invitation
Unlikely," Otago Daily Times, 4 May 2003 2003, Staff, "Twain Sale, Tenure Issues Highlighted
" Otago Daily Times, 17 September 2004 2004, Neal Wallace, "An Expert Says Increasing
Public Access to Private Land Will Impact on Farm Productivity. Public Access Could Hit
Farm Wealth, Says Expert " Otago Daily Times, 4 November 2004 2004, Neal Wallace and
Sally Rae, "High Country Sale Has Raised Expectations: Mp Sale More Than Twice Market
Rate, Land Agents Say " Otago Daily Times 27 January 2004 2004. Mike Crean, "Twain's
Track Is for Walkin'," The Press, 25 SEP 2004 2004.
21 As of 7 Feb., 2005, there were 273, though with ongoing land reform, the number
of leases is diminishing by the month. Cabinet Policy Committee, "Pol(05)14," 1..  For the
latest update on numbers, see
http://www.linz.govt.nz/rcs/linz/pub/web/root/core/CrownProperty/tractivitygraph/index.jsp
23 Harry Broad, "The Changing Role of Government in the Management of Its High
Country Lands," (Wellington: Victoria University of Wellington Public Policy Department, no
date).
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1992
1977 Reserves Act passes, conveying perception of preservation as a
legitimate land use23
Early
1980s
Introduction of lucrative helicopter based deer hunting inspires
leaseholders to exclude non-paying deerstalkers, who had traditionally
enjoyed free hunting access with permission
1982 Clayton report recommends freeholding productive pastoral land to boost
productivity, while retaining some land for conservation
1982 Federated Mountain Clubs (FMC) takes up deerstalkers’ cause, launching
Campaign for Change in pastoral lease tenure.  FMC forms Public Land
Coalition with the Royal Society for Protection of Forest and Bird,24 Public
Access NZ, and Acclimatisation Societies (later to become Fish and
Game Councils of NZ).
1984 4th Labour government elected.  State sector reforms based in neoliberal
ideologies and public choice administrative model of New Public
Management introduced.
1987 NZ Forest Service disestablished.
Dept of Lands and Survey, administrators of leases, disestablished.
Dept of Lands established
Dept of Survey and Land Information established (DOSLI)
Dept of Conservation (DOC) established, to manage about 30% of NZ
LandCorp, a state owned enterprise established
ownership of pastoral leases passes to Dept of Lands
administration of pastoral leases passes to LandCorp
1990 Dept of Lands folds into Dept of Land and Survey Information
1992 representatives from DOSLI and LandCorp devise an administrative
process to reform land tenure under the Land Act.
1995 Crown Pastoral Land Bill introduced to Parliament by Minister of Lands
and Conservation (2 separate offices) Dennis Marshall
1996 DOSLI becomes Land Information New Zealand (LINZ)
1998 CPLA passes, after 34 leases have undergone tenure review under the
Land Act administrative process.
Feb.
2005
64 Leases have undergone tenure review
38%, or 109,513 hectares have returned to full Crown ownership under
DOC
62%, or 178,288 hectares have been conveyed to farmers as freehold.
June 30,
2005
Crown has paid farmers total of NZ$15.5 million in equalization payments
since 1998.
Beginning of the end of NZ pastoral leases and US federal lands?
Instigated by Nevada state senator Dean Rhodes and ranchers in the
American West, the Sagebrush Rebellion sought to transfer authority over
federal lands to the state governments.25  The Rebellion gained sporadic
                                           
24 somewhat akin in prominence and worldview to the US Sierra Club
25 the definitive authority on the Sagebrush Rebellion is R. McGreggor Cawley,
Federal Land, Western Anger : The Sagebrush Rebellion and Environmental Politics
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support from some of the states, and even then-Presidential candidate
Reagan famously declared his sympathy in a 1980 campaign speech.26  But
Democratic members of Congress opposed the Rebellion, citing the
Constitution and other legal barriers to implementing the sought-after
reforms.27 And even more than 20 years later, environmental groups still
declare their staunch opposition to the Rebellion.28  By contrast, the push for
reform of New Zealand’s pastoral leases came from all sectors – institutional
and administrative momentum, as well as political pressure from all interest
groups.
NZ Institutional Reforms
For the Commissioner of Crown Lands and the Minister of Lands, the
1980s was a decade political pressure from all sides for tenure reform, and a
decade of state sector reforms inspired by neoliberal precepts of
governance.29  In the field of natural resources, these reforms meant the end
of the NZ’s subscription to the multiple use paradigm which has dominated the
                                                                                                                            
(Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 1993).  See also a nice brief description by the
University of Nevada Archives at http://www.library.unr.edu/specoll/mss/85-04.html, last
checked 30 October, 2005.
26 Reagan declared “I am a Sagebrush Rebel” in Salt Lake City, Utah, in August
1980. See the Property Rights Foundation of America, Inc. for a description.
(http://www.prfamerica.org/FedLandownership.html)
27 see for example a letter from Rep. Morris Udall to his constituents supporting
retention federal ownership of federal land.  Morris Udall, The "Sagebrush Rebellion": A
Report from Mo Udall, 2nd Congressional District of Arizona, Volume Xvii, Number 4, October
1979 (University of Arizona Library Archives, 1979 [cited 30 October 2005]); available from
http://dizzy.library.arizona.edu/branches/spc/udall/congrept/96th/7910.html.
28 For example, Robert F. Kennedy, sometime spokesperson for the Natural
Resources Defense Council, describes the Rebellion as follows in Rolling Stone magazine:
"The Sagebrush Rebellion [was] a coalition of industry money and right-wing ideologues that
helped elect Reagan president. The big polluters who started the Sagebrush Rebellion were
successful because they managed to broaden their constituency with anti-regulatory, anti-
labor and anti-environmental rhetoric that had great appeal both among Christian
fundamentalist leaders such as Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson, and in certain Western
communities where hostility to government is deeply rooted. Big polluters found that they
could organize this discontent into a potent political force that possessed the two ingredients
of power in American democracy: money and intensity." Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., "Crimes
against Nature," Rolling Stone 2003.
29 for more on the 1980s reforms in NZ, see Jonathan Boston, Public Management :
The New Zealand Model (Auckland, N.Z.: Oxford University Press, 1996)..
And for the role of neoliberal precepts in the reforms, see Shaun Goldfinch,
"Paradigms, Economic Ideas and Institutions in Economic Restructuring: The Case of New
Zealand," Political Science 52, no. 1 (2000).
Finally, for more specifics on the reforms in the environmental sector, see Ton Bührs
and Robert V. Bartlett, Environmental Policy in New Zealand : The Politics of Clean and
Green? (Auckland ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
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US public lands since 1960 passage of the Multiple Use and Sustained Yield
Act for the National Forests, and 1976 passage of the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act for BLM lands.
The 1980s reforms in NZ shifted land title to the private sector for
productive forest land where there was considered to be little public interest
(Broad, no date, p. 47); and centralized authority over land where
conservation and recreation values were considered high into the Department
of Conservation (DOC), created in 1987.30  On a broader level, outside of
natural resources, the 1980s witnessed growing discomfort with the New
Zealand government owning productive assets that could be managed by the
market.31
Even before the 1984 election of the Fourth Labour government which
“out-Thatchered Thatcher and out-Reaganed Reagan” (Freedland, 2000),
there was widespread dissatisfaction with the multiple use paradigm – among
agency officials and conservation advocacy groups who were growing in
importance.  According the Andy Kirkland, former director general of the NZ
Forest Service, “the highest attainable goal for managers under [multiple use]
is a state of moderate dissatisfaction among all client groups.”32  And the
conservation groups, led by the charismatic Guy Salmon, were pressing for
the creation of a central conservation agency and an end to multiple use,
which the early Kiwi environmentalists called “multiple abuse,” (Pawson and
Brooking, 2002; Young, 2004) and “state-sponsored vandalism” (Buhrs, 2000,
p. 33).
In 1987, the 4th Labour government dissolved the NZ Forest Service,
with some of its land being corporatized and later privatized, and the
                                           
30 see generally Bührs and Bartlett, Environmental Policy in New Zealand : The
Politics of Clean and Green, David Young, Our Islands, Our Selves : A History of
Conservation in New Zealand (Dunedin, N.Z.: University of Otago Press, 2004).
31 “They promptly dumped every economic principle that had once been Labour holy
writ. The party converted to the free market with a zeal that out-Thatchered Thatcher and out-
Reaganed Reagan. If it moved, Labour and its finance minister Roger Douglas privatised it.
Taxes were slashed, workers' protection binned. New Zealand became the citadel of the new
right.” Jonathan Freedland, "The Future Is Kiwi: New Labour in Power, Special Report," The
Guardian, Wednesday May 3 2000.
32 Andy Kirkland, "Forestry, a Multiple Use Enterprise" (paper presented at the
Proceedings of the 13th Forestry Conference, Rotorua, 1989). cited in Broad, "The Changing
Role of Government in the Management of Its High Country Lands."
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remaining transferred into the newly formed DOC (Birchfield and Grant, 1993;
McIntyre, et al., 2001).  The government also disbanded another multiple use
agency, the Department of Lands and Survey, and shifted responsibility for
New Zealand’s Reserves and National Parks to DOC.
The pastoral leases did not participate in the privatization boom of the
1980s, as their fragile ecological state and iconic cultural values justified
retaining them in Crown ownership.33  The responsibility for the pastoral
leases was divided into surviving remnants of the old Department of Lands
and Survey.  Administration of the leases was delegated to the newly formed
state-owned enterprise, LandCorp, while ownership of the land itself was
delegated to Department of Survey and Land Information (DOSLI), which
eventually turned into LINZ (Broad, no date, pp. 43, 16).34
Lastly, in 1991, Parliament passed the Resource Management Act, a
comprehensive urban and environmental planning statute which authorized
newly created District and Regional Councils to create 10 year land use plans
that would be effects-based, and would adhere to the principles of sustainable
development (Resource Management Act, 1991, §30).  After a decade of
centralizing authority over many conservation values into the new Department
of Conservation, the RMA decentralized authority over environmental
protection and sustainable development on private land.  Passage of RMA
created further support for land reform among conservation-minded Members
of Parliament, as there was some feeling that the RMA would be more
effective at achieving ecological sustainability than the Land Act, which does
not mention conservation (Broad, no date, p. 44).
                                           
33 According to the Commissioner of Crown Lands, “it was recognized fairly early that
the high country leases had an iconic value which would be more controversial politically, so
they were not freeholded as easily or as frequently under the Land Act.”
34 According to the last Director General of the now-defunct Department of Lands and
Survey, a huge political debate about the future of pastoral leases followed the split up of the
department.  The debate was led by Forest and Bird, FMC, Public Access New Zealand.
These groups very strongly advocated that pastoral leases should not be given to LandCorp,
because they contained vast areas of high conservation/recreation values, and most of the
land was not farmed anyway.  "The farmers went out of their tree on this one."  The
government in 1987 was conservation-oriented, so would not listen to anything but the
conservation viewpoint.  They put the administration of pastoral leases with LandCorp, but did
not give the ownership of the leases to land Corp.  Thus they separated the management and
administration of pastoral leases from the ownership of the land.
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1980s: Push for tenure reform from all sides
Though the government did not privatise and divide pastoral lands at
the same time as the national forests,35 the Minister of Lands did respond to
pressure from farming, recreation, and conservation groups as well as the
new model of governance that swept into New Zealand in the 1980s.36  By the
1980s, many high country farmers had been lobbying the government for the
right to convert their leases to freehold for decades.37  In 1982, the
government-commissioned Clayton Commission of Inquiry into the Pastoral
Leases found that the pastoral leases’ restrictions were causing severe
underdevelopment of the pastoral estate (Brookers Looseleaf Legal Service,
1995, para.11.22.02).  The Commission recommended large-scale
freeholding of pastoral land in order to use diversification as a management
strategy to promote pest control, productive farming, and grassland health
(Hayman, 2003).  And when the leases were transferred to the state-owned
commercial enterprise LandCorp in 1987, farmers saw an opportunity to push
for freehold.38  So by the late 1980s "the High Country Committee of
Federated Farmers was rocking the boat strongly … for freehold."39  Then in
1994, the Working Party on Sustainable Land Management (dubbed the
Martin Report) recommended reforming pastoral land legislation “with the
object of freeholding all the land not required by the Crown for the public
interest,” with the assumption that granting freehold would allow the farmers to
use land more sustainably.40
                                           
35 the 4th Labour government did propose a new Land Act in 1989, but it was lost in
the shuffle at the end of massive reforms, and went nowhere Broad, "The Changing Role of
Government in the Management of Its High Country Lands," 43..
36 According to a former Director General of the Department of Lands and Survey,
land tenure reform is not related to the New Zealand Forest Service split up.  But "it is result
of that 1984-87 reforms, with the Crown getting out of the business of administering leases"
(and resource development).
37 But according to the former Director General of Department of Lands and Survey,
not all farmers stood behind reform efforts as some thought reform efforts would open a
Pandora’s box which might lead to the lessees losing everything.
38 Interview with former Director General, Department of Lands and Survey
39 Ibid.
40 Martin report as quoted and described in Brookers Looseleaf Legal Service, "Land
Law," 11.22.02.
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Recreation – conservation join crusade for land reform
But land tenure reform was not spawned by farmers alone.  The
recreation and conservation interest groups gained momentum after the 1977
passage of the Reserves Act, which conveyed a perception that preservation
was a legitimate use of Crown lands.41  And in the early 1980s, the recreation
and conservation groups joined in the crusade for land tenure reform, though
from a very different angle from the farmers.  Just as the government grew
uncomfortable with state ownership of productive resources in the 1980s, in
the late 1970s and 1980s conservation groups began to question lessees’
right to determine high country land use as well as their ability to protect
native species and provide reliable recreation access.42  Indeed the proposal
for tenure review in its current form was first put forth by the "greenies," the
recreation-conservation groups.43
However the two groups had very different ideas of the desired
outcomes of reform – some farmers pushed to convert entire leases to
freehold, while recreation and conservation groups worked in parallel to
resume parts of leases to convert them from Crown land to public reserves.44
                                           
41 Broad, "The Changing Role of Government in the Management of Its High Country
Lands."
42 For a sample of FMC’s discomfort, see: Hugh Barr, "Freeholding Pastoral Leases,"
Federated Mountain Clubs Bulletin, March 1982..
And the Forest and Bird magazine chronicles the group’s long-standing efforts to
amend land tenure patterns in the high country in the following article: Eugenie Sage, "The
Big Steal," Forest and Bird, August 1995..
Finally, former adviser to Minister of Lands Dennis Marshall and current DOC staffer
describes the rec-cons questions in Broad, "The Changing Role of Government in the
Management of Its High Country Lands.".
43 Interview with former Director General, Department of Lands and Survey
44 According to former Director General of Department of Lands and Survey, “tenure
review as you have it now was instigated by the greeny recreation groups.  The right to
freehold was definitely instigated by the farmers, but tenure reform was the idea of the
recreation/conservation groups.”  Some farmers were talking about freeholding everything,
but the greenies never talked of presuming entire leases, just reviewing each property
individually.  The two groups were lobbying in parallel, but not simultaneously, and the whole
thing went in bursts.  When one side would raise the issue, the other would react.  When
farmers raise the issue, the greenies would be alerted by the minister of conservation for a
response.  But the farmers were not alerted by the minister of lands.  So it did not work the
other way around.  The minister of conservation had only one job, to look after the recreation
and conservation interest.”  (Interview with former Director General, Department of Lands and
Survey)
But some farmers, though not all, had been pushing for the right to freehold their
entire lease, while no recreation-conservation advocate lobbying to reserve an entire lease.
(Interview with former Director General, Department of Lands and Survey)
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According to Stone (Stone, 2001), ambiguity of goals is essential to garner
widespread political support for a policy.  In this case, there were two camps
with very different agendae simultaneously advocating for the same policy.
Because the land reform policy idea had both conservation-recreation and
freehold goals, each group could claim a victory and each could find reason to
support it.
Lack of Recreation Access Sparks Support for Reform
Why did the recreation and conservation groups support reform?
Though farmers had been advocating economic efficiency, and the
conservation groups advocated ecological integrity, recreation access proved
to be a powerful political catalyst for reform.45  Some elements of the
recreation community had long been concerned that so much high elevation
land with recreation potential was off-limits to recreationists, and the “Deer
Wars” of the 1970s and 1980s sparked action on the issue of recreation
access to the South Island high country.46
Traditionally, the deerstalkers had been very welcome on runs, as they
were providing somewhat of a service removing pests.  But as live deer
became valuable for farming, the deerstalkers were no longer welcome.
Suddenly with helicopters and cheaper air travel, hunters could ship meat off
to Germany quickly, easily, and profitably; and live capture of deer for
domestic venison farming became very profitable.  These professional
helicopter hunters were willing to pay for hunting access to leased land, while
private deerstalkers were accustomed to access gratis, though by permission.
In 1980, one deer was worth about $2000 for live recovery.  When deer
became profitable, lessees were not as happy to allow nonpaying private
deerstalkers on their runs as they had been traditonally.  The limited access
for hunting and huge drop-off in deer population "made life hectic for the poor
deerstalkers."47  At that point, prominent members of the Federated Mountain
Clubs (FMC) became very keen on making lease land more public in order to
                                           
45 Interview with NZ Deerstalkers Association advocate.
46 Interview with Patron, Federated Mountain Clubs
47 Interview with NZ Deerstalkers Association advocate
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secure public recreation access.48  The NZ Deerstalkers Association worked
extensively with FMC, who in turn started a campaign for more access
because “it’s no good having land if you can’t get to it.”49
The Deer Wars and aftermath brought the issue of access to pastoral
leases to the fore, and further raised questions of property rights in Crown
land.  The land is owned by the Crown, with certain rights – including
recreation access – leased, or alienated, to the leaseholder.  But the
deerstalkers raised the issue of the public-ness of Crown lands.  The weighty
Federated Mountain Clubs (FMC)50 joined ranks with the deerstalkers, and
brought the Royal Society for the Protection of Forest and Bird51 and the
Acclimatization Societies (which became the Fish and Game Councils of New
Zealand) with them.  These recreation and conservation interest groups
formally allied themselves in 198452 into the Public Lands Coalition,53 and
launched a campaign for change.54  The Coalition sought to restore public
access to pastoral leases by returning the land above 1000m into full Crown
                                           
48 Interview with NZ Deerstalkers Association advocate
49 Interview with Patron, Federated Mountain Clubs
50 FMC has about 12,000 members, according to an FMC brochure
(http://otmc.co.nz/fmc.html, last visited 30 October, 2005)
51 Forest and Bird has over 40,000 members
(http://www.forestandbird.org.nz/aboutus/index.asp, last visited 30 October, 2005)
52 also in 1984, conservation and recreation groups were successful and securing a
seat for themselves on the Land Settlement Board, the advisory committee to Department of
Lands and Survey that had previously comprised only farmers.  But the Board was
disestablished soon after “greenies” were invited.  (Interview with former Director General,
Department of Lands and Survey)
53 Over the years, the coalition's name has changed several times from Public Lands
Coalition to High Country Public Lands Coalition, to High Country Coalition (Interview with NZ
Deerstalkers Association advocate).  Its current incarnation, the High Country Coalition,
became active again in 2001 when tenure review began again in earnest after a post CPLA
lull.
54 The campaign for change was launched at FMC's annual meeting in 1982, when
members passed a resolution calling for the government to reserve all land in pastoral leases
above 1000 m for conservation.  Although the groups operated in coalition, there were some
philosophical differences.  FMC saw the exclusive nature of pastoral leases as damaging to
the public access aspect of the recreation resource, while Forest and Bird saw high elevation
grazing as ecologically damaging first and foremost (interview with former Executive Board
member, FMC).  For more history on FMC's long-standing support for land tenure reform,
see: A. Evans, "Unalienated Crown Land," Federated Mountain Clubs Bulletin, September
1979, David Henson, "F.M.C. Seminar: The Future of Pastoral Leasehold Lands," Federated
Mountain Clubs Bulletin, June 1983, David Henson, "Pastoral Leases -- Land Settlement
Board's Resolution Inadequate " Federated Mountain Clubs Bulletin, September 1983, David
Henson, "Pastoral Lands -- F.M.C. Urges Government Action," Federated Mountain Clubs
Bulletin, June 1985.
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ownership, while allowing continued farming on the low altitude land.55  In
short, the “greenies” sought to make the high elevation Crown lands more
public.
Administrative lead-up to tenure review
Finally, in addition to the political pressure for separation of production
and conservation and political pressure from farmers and the recreation and
conservation lobbies, the Department of Lands and Survey and the Land
Settlement Boards had been dabbling in the idea of divesting of pastoral
leases from the 1970s through the 1990s.56  This administrative lead-up to
land reform established the precedent for separating pastoral lease property
interests among the Crown and the lessee, and laid the foundation for a
redistribution process built on consultation with interested parties.
                                           
55 According to NZ Deerstalkers Association advocate, FMC and coalition members
saw the inclusion of high elevation land in the pastoral leases as an historical accident.  As
surveying and fencing were often prohibitively expensive in the mid-19th century when the
leases were very first established in an earlier form, pastoral leases came to include the entire
slope rather than just the more productive low altitude land.  It was easier to divide land by
ridges and rivers, rather than carefully demarcated zones of high and low productivity.
56 According to interviews with a LINZ contractor, and Commissioner of Crown Lands,
and Tenure Review Manager in Christchurch (see also Broad, "The Changing Role of
Government in the Management of Its High Country Lands.")
Reclassification of land from pastoral to the farm class (and hence convertible to
freehold) had been happening to some degree since pastoral lease establishment in 1948,
but only in the farms of lower elevation.  In 1948, the government issued about 1000 pastoral
leases, with about 400 in the high country and about 600 in lower country.  Between 1948 and
1982, many of the lower elevation farms reclassified and converted to freehold.
And in 1985, the Land Settlement Board made another attempt at tenure review
which was again aborted.  It issued a reclassification policy by which parts of the pastoral
leases could be transferred to freehold, with parts retained for the Crown.  This policy
involved a more extensive consultation process than the trial balloon launched in 1982.  DLS
did not have the resources to carry out the consultation or implement the policy, so the
Commissioner of Crown Lands "pulled the pin on the project."
On top of this was the Protected Natural Areas program, which sought to identify
lands which were deemed to be in the community's interest to protect for biological,
ecological, or aesthetic values.  Between 1987 and 1990, DOC acquired a few areas in Otago
and Southland but "not a lot".  But these PNA acquisitions represent the first successful
attempts at land tenure reform.
64 The RLMP grew out of a 1988 Report of the Rabbit and Land Management Task
Force to the Minister of Agriculture, Rt. Hon. C.J. Moyle.
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Land tenure reform got “kick started” under the Rabbit and Land
Management Program (RLMP).64  By the late 1980s, the rabbits in the South
Island high country were so abundant, that they were causing desertification
in the drier areas of Central Otago.65  The Rabbit and Land Management Task
Force and subsequent program were established to identify why rabbits were
such a problem in the first place.66  Taking a systems approach to rabbits, the
Task Force director (currently the Parliamentary Commissioner for the
Environment) characterized the land problem as “not about the kindest way to
kill a rabbit. It is about how we prevent the death of a fragile piece of New
Zealand.  We will leave future generations the corpse of an entire region if we
continue to argue about which painkiller to use on a near-terminal patient.”67
The Task Force concluded that the pastoral system of tenure was at
least partly to blame – that the constraints of pastoralism forced lessees into
low-intensity farming which produced prime rabbit habitat.  According to the
former director: “at one point, [a colleague] and I looked at the land and said ‘if
this were in vineyards, there wouldn’t be a rabbit here.’”  The Task Force
concluded that intensification and diversification of land use would mitigate the
rabbit problem in two ways: 1) by changing the habitat to a more fertile,
productive landscape in which rabbits do not compete as well; 2) by
increasing the return on the land and hence allowing more capital to flow into
rabbit and pest control.
The first lease to undergo reform was Mt Difficulty Station,68 whose
lessee was part of the RLMP, and volunteered his station to be a “test case”
of tenure reform. 69  According to the Director of RLMP: “The Mt Difficulty
tenure review was sort of a natural progression that came out of the idea that
we needed to deal with tenure.  There was a fair bit of nervousness, of
caution, and opposition among the farming community.”  But some farmers
                                           
65 RLM Task Force Report to Rt Hon. C.J. Moyle, Min Agriculture. Sept. 1998. p 1
66 interview with current Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, former
Director of the Rabbit Land Management Programme (1989 – 1995).
67 Broad, "The Changing Role of Government in the Management of Its High Country
Lands," 12. quoting Director of the Rabbit Land Management Programme, Morgan Williams
68 The review was conducted on part of Mt Difficulty Station in the Central Otago
district between 1990 and 1993.  See Figure 3.
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saw it as a feasible (read affordable) way to freehold parts of the property.  If a
lease had conservation values to trade, then the farmer could attain freehold
without producing the capital that would otherwise be necessary.70
This Mt Difficulty test case sparked both land tenure reform, and,
indirectly, the viticulture industry in the Bannockburn area of Central Otago.71
It resulted in some pastoral land being converted to freehold in exchange for
some land being resumed for conservation in a Protected Natural Area.  But in
the end, part of the original station was still retained in the lease.  And the
internal process of the Mt Difficulty process closely resembled the modern
process.72
In sum, the pressure for land tenure reform came from all sides –
farming, recreation, conservation, administration, and government ideology –
though the various sides each had their own reasons for supporting reform.
And each faction had its own reasons for concern about reform.  And these
reasons were often quite contradictory – a recreation advocate might want
free recreation access, while the lessee wants to launch a private safari park.
The interest group landscape resembles Rudyard Kipling’s ideal of “If
all men count with you – but none too much.”73  Thanks to the multiple and
ambiguous policy goals, regardless of underlying motivation, the end result is
the same – each party wants reform as each party has something to gain.
With some particularistic exceptions, this remains true today: the land reform
effort has “got no one against us.”74   Each of the interest groups supports
tenure review in principle,75 even if some have concerns about the process or
results.76  And the vested interests show their support for the process by
                                                                                                                            
69 In a side note, part of the land from that inaugural tenure review is now part of the
Felton Road vineyard near Bannockburn.  See Figure 3.
70 interview with current Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, former
Director of the Rabbit Land Management Programme (1989 – 1995).
71 interview with current Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, former
Director of the Rabbit Land Management Programme (1989 – 1995).
72 According to a contractor, the initial proposal was publicly advertised for comment,
submissions received, and public consultations conducted.
73 Rudyard Kipling, If (London: Macmillan and company, ltd., 1914).
74 Interview with Patron, Federated Mountain Clubs
75 Interviews with Forest and Bird staff, FMC pastoral lands convener, Patron of
Federated Mountain Clubs
76 Interviews with landscape advocate, Forest and Bird staff, recreation advocate
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continuing77 to enter and complete negotiations that are entirely voluntary for
the lessees.78
The idea for land tenure reform enjoyed widespread support because
the current property rights arrangements made it such that both sides have
something to gain from the other.  The farmer got freehold title to productive
land on which he or she may diversify land use and expand out of sheep
farming.  Recreation and conservation interests got recreation access to, and
protection from grazing, for vast swathes of spectacular high country
landscape.79  According to the Conservation Director of Forest and Bird: “Both
recreation/conservation and farming saw the benefits of splitting the uses …
You gotta remember that this came in under a National government.80  They
are the farmers’ party.  There's no way that National would pass a bill that the
farmer saw as unfavorable.  It's clear in the parliamentary debate in Hansard’s
that, at the time, all sides saw it as win-win."
Land tenure reform under the Land Act: 1991 – 1998
In response to political pressure, and administrative and institutional
momentum, in 1991 the Commissioner of Crown Lands directed staff from
DOSLI and LandCorp to develop an administrative process of land tenure
reform.  The period from 1992-1998 is referred to as a “trial period” in land
tenure reform.81  While first seen by some as “a bit of a dog’s breakfast,”82 the
process was evolving, formalizing, and gaining more steps.83
As an administrative process, early land tenure reform was ultra vires,
or extra-legal, as it lacked specific statutory authority (Broad, no date, p. 47).
                                           
77 according to LINZ, as of 30 September, 2005, 67% of high country lessees have
entered or completed reviews (characterized in a graph published by LINZ on the Web, title,
Crown Pastoral Lease Tenure Review Activity as at 30 September, 2005: found at
http://www.LINZ.govt.nz/rcs/LINZ/pub/web/root/core/CrownProperty/tractivitygraph/index.jsp,
last visited 30 October, 2005
78 CPLA 1998 ss27,28. and Land Information New Zealand, "Government Objectives
for the South Island High Country:  Report Back to the Chair, Cabinet Policy Committee
(Office of the Minister for Land Information, Office of the Minister of Conservation, Office of
the Minister of Agriculture and for Rural Affairs)," (Wellington, NZ: 2003).
79 See Figure 4.
80 This is the center-right political party of NZ, as opposed to the center-left Labour
party.
81 Interview with LINZ contractor.
82 Interview with Fish and Game Councils of NZ staff.  This is not necessarily a
derogatory term, just means a mish-mosh, you never know what you’ll get.
83 Interview with former chair of the High Country Committee, Federated Farmers.
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According a former president of the High Country Committee of the Federated
Farmers: “Under the old Land Act, it wasn't clear whether the process was
legal.  The Crown and lessees feared judicial review, so the Crown put a lot of
effort into getting outcomes that were acceptable to all.  The only real
objective was to get out of pastoral leasing, so they came up with a process
that all could be happy with."84
During this period, 34 leases completed the reform process.  According
to a newspaper account:
“About 40 per cent of the more ecologically fragile and less- productive
land was kept for conservation and contributed to Canterbury's first
high-country conservation park, the 22,000 hectare Korowai-Torlesse,
established in 2001.
The newly freeholded farmers, meanwhile, diversified with a
vengeance. One set up a lucrative tyre-testing strip, another the
Cardrona ski-field.
But the Land Act was never designed to consider such changes. The
process was unwieldy and in- house with little or no public input. In
1998, the Government introduced the Crown Pastoral Land Act
allowing the current review of all the high-country leases.” (Hayman,
2003)
The End of the Road: Introduction of the Crown Pastoral Land Bill
In 1995, Dennis Marshall, then the Minister of Lands and Conservation
(separate offices), moved to give statutory authority to the land tenure reform
process.85  With some ado,86 Parliament signed the Crown Pastoral Land Act
(CPLA) into law in 1998, with a party-line vote under a center-right led
government led by the National Party.
The CPLA aims to "establish a system for reviewing the tenure of
Crown lands held under certain perpetually renewable leases." (Land
                                           
84 Interview with former chair of the High Country Committee, Federated Farmers.
85 Interview with DOC tenure review manager, Canterbury.
86 For media coverage of the bill’s passage, see for example:  Allan Evans, "Why
Conservationists Object to High-Country Land Law Changes," The Press, 1995 Mar. 24 1995,
Denis. Marshall, "Law Change Needed to Manage and Protect the High Country," The Press,
1995 Mar. 23 1995, Staff, "High Country `under Threat'," The Press, 1995 June 15 1995,
Staff, "Owning the High Country," The Press, 1995 Apr. 8 1995, Staff, "Govt to Freehold High
Country," The Press, 1995 Mar. 10 1995, Staff, "Land Act Campaign May Be Mounted," The
Press, 1995 Apr. 1 1995, Staff, "Crown Lease Legislation Worries Landscape Architects," The
Press, 1996 Feb. 1 1996.
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Information New Zealand, 1998, p 4)  It sets four goals for land tenure reform
(Crown Pastoral Land Act, 1998, §24):
1) "to promote the management of reviewable land in a way that is
ecologically sustainable;
2) “subject to [above], enable reviewable land capable of economic use
to be freed from the management constraints (direct and indirect)
resulting from its tenure under reviewable instruments;
3) “to enable the protection of the significant inherent values of
reviewable land – by the creation of protective mechanisms, or
(preferably) by the restoration of the land concerned to full Crown
ownership and control.
4) “subject to [above], to make easier the securing of public access to
and enjoyment of reviewable land; and the freehold disposal of
reviewable land."
In other words, the land reform process guided by CPLA aims to
change land use patterns in two ways: 1) by freeing land capable of
commercial use from the constraints of the Crown lease by conveying
freehold title to the formal leaseholder; 2) by protecting significant inherent
values (recreation, conservation, historical, cultural, ecological …) in one of
two ways -- creating a legal covenant87 over newly freeholded land or,
preferably, resuming the land into full Crown ownership.  Between 1992 and
June 2005, about 229,652 hectares (or 42%) converted to freehold and about
165,446  hectares88 (or 58%) returned to full Crown ownership (Cabinet Policy
Committee, 2005, p. 3).
Discussion and Conclusion
This chapter compares the Sagebrush Rebellion and New Zealand
land tenure reform, and asks why one succeeded and the other did not.  New
Zealand farmers succeeded in their campaign for devolution of authority over
land to the farmer, while American ranchers failed in their attempt to transfer
title over federal lands to the states.  The New Zealand reforms had endemic
momentum from three sources: the institutional reforms of the 1980s;
administrative lead-up to land reforms; and political pressure from all sectors
in support of land reform.  The Sagebrush Rebels lacked institutional and
                                           
87 Called a conservation easement in the US.
88 For statisticians, these two categories yield a p-value of 0.075 in a 2-tailed t test.
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administrative momentum, and stood against the Constitutional prohibition on
state laws contravening and superceding federal law (Udall, 1979).
In addition to institutional momentum, this chapter reveals key
differences in the political alignments of interest groups, and property rights
arrangements in NZ pastoral leases vs US grazing permits.  In New Zealand,
the farmers, recreation groups and conservation groups all supported the
reforms; while in the US the conservation and recreation groups were dead-
set against the Sagebrush Rebels’ campaign.  Why?  Because the property
rights arrangements created in the (NZ) Land Act of 1948 were far more
favourable to the farmer and less favourable to the would-be recreationist than
those created by the US Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 and US public land case
law.  NZ Pastoral leases allow the lessee to exclude trespassers, including
recreational hikers, backpackers, and hunters,89 while US grazing permits do
not.90  This exclusion of “deer-stalkers” sparked the Deer Wars of the 1970s
and ‘80s, and rallied support for land reform among deerstalkers, and their
friends in the powerful recreation and conservation lobbies.  In other words,
property rights arrangements elicited support for NZ land reform from all
quarters – farmers, conservation, and recreation.  While in the US, ranchers
were joined in their campaign only by those from their end of the political
spectrum.
                                           
89 See chapter 4
90 see the Supreme Court cases regarding fencing on public land (especially Light v
US, 1911 (as cited and described in Samuel T. Dana and Sally K. Fairfax, Forest and Range
Policy, Its Development in the United States, 2d ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980).) and
Bergen v.  Lawrence, 1988.  These cases deal with excluding farm and wild animals, not
recreationists, but the principles of fencing on public lands apply to recreation as well as
animals.
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Figure 3: Land use change following land tenure reform.  Part of the land in this estate
winery came out of Mt Difficulty Station, the first lease to undergo land tenure reform.
Felton Road winery, near Bannockburn, Central Otago, NZ.
Figure 4: Trampers descending a foothill of the Southern Alps, Canterbury, New
Zealand.
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Chapter 4
Trading Sticks with the Crown:
Redistributing Property Rights to Effect Land Use Change
Introduction
Imagine that the US Bureau of Land Management (BLM) is getting out
of the landlord business by conveying fee-simple title to almost 60% of the
most productive federal grazing land in the American West to the ranchers.  In
addition, BLM terminates grazing permits on the remaining 40% of the land,
and creates various forms of reserves to protect the land’s conservation,
recreation, landscape, or cultural heritage values.  These reserve
designations comprise national monuments, national parks, and wilderness
areas; and grazing is prohibited this portion of what had been federal grazing
land.
Now imagine that US grazing permits were compensable property
rights, in contrast to current statute and case law.91  Then picture a process in
which the federal government and each rancher negotiate to buy the other’s
compensable use rights.  The negotiations yield a result in which the
government pays the ranchers twice as much as the ranchers pay the
government, and ranchers end up with almost 60% of the land as fee-simple
and $15.5 million.  Each of the new freehold parcels has at least one access
easement across it for recreation access to the conservation land behind.  But
little if any of the new freehold land is encumbered by conservation
easements and their limitations on resource use.
                                           
91 L Raymond, "Viewpoint: Are Grazing Rights on Public Lands a Form of Private
Property?," JOURNAL OF RANGE MANAGEMENT 50, no. 4 (1997), Leigh Stafford
Raymond, Private Rights in Public Resources: Equity and Property Allocation in Market-
Based Environmental Policy (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 2003).
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Now shift
your gaze to the
extreme
southwest -- to
the tussock
bunchgrass,
scree, and
glacier-cloaked
eastern slopes
of the Southern
Alps of New
Zealand’s South Island.
Figure 5: Lake Hawea, with Dingleburn Station on right-hand shoreline.  Near Wanaka,
Lakes District, New Zealand.  After the change in land tenure, the former pastoral
leasehold is now a patchwork mosaic of public and private land.  Very roughly, land
below the snow line is now private; land above is managed by DOC. Dingleburn is an
exceptional case, by virtue of its size (23,000 ha) and the large portion transferred to
DOC (70.6%). Despite the latter, recreationists must now traverse nearly 10km of
recently privatized land before reaching the public recreation land beyond.
Like the US before it,92 New Zealand is using the redistribution of
property rights in natural resources as a policy tool to effect land use change.
One-tenth of New Zealand is undergoing land reform which transfers title to
productive land from the Crown to the pastoral leaseholders, and shifts the
remaining land to the Department of Conservation (DOC).  This article
examines the legal structures and administrative mechanisms of land tenure
reform of the pastoral estate on the South Island in light of an abstract view of
property.  After unpacking the mechanics of the exchange and redistribution o
f property rights, it uses data from photographs, legislation, case law,
government documents, and key informant interviews to address three
questions: 1) Is the redistribution of property rights changing land use
                                           
92 Among others, see the Homestead Act, the General Mining Act, Taylor Grazing
Act, especially as described in L Raymond and SK Fairfax, "Fragmentation of Public Domain
Law and Policy: An Alternative to the "Shift-to-Retention" Thesis.," Natural Resources Journal
39, no. 4 (1999).  See also George W. Bush’s recent proposal for ”Urban Homesteading” to
promote the post-Katrina redevelopment of New Orleans.
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patterns? 2) At what cost to the New Zealand people? And 3) Are there other
mechanisms that might achieve similar goals?
New Zealand is giving up on the multiple use land management paradigm
that dominates US public lands.93  This land tenure reform of the pastoral
estate is the last step towards separating commercial production from
conservation.  In 1987, the Fourth Labour government corporatised and later
privatized the timber resource on state-owned forest land, disestablished the
NZ Forest Service,94 and shifted authority over the state-owned forest land
containing indigenous forest to the newly formed DOC.95  Managed by way of
pastoral leases, the pastoral estate is slowly undergoing a similar
redistribution of uses and title.
Currently the land, 2.4 million hectares, is held by the Crown and
alienated by way of perpetually renewable leases to farmers for exclusive
occupation and use of the pastoral96 resource.  Pastoral leases create a
tangled web of perceived rights, financial interests, and public and private
claims in Crown-owned land.  In pastoral leases, the various property rights
are divided among the lease holder and the Crown.  Slowly, on a farm by farm
basis, the lessees are entering negotiations with the Crown in which the
bundle of property rights is redistributed.
The Land Act of 1948 governs the present distribution of property rights,
while the Crown Pastoral Land Act of 1998 governs the redistribution with the
end goal of separating land uses – privatizing economically productive land
and centralizing Crown authority over land with conservation, recreation,
heritage, and landscape values.  As a result, the lessee gets freehold, fee-
simple title to the more productive land “capable of economic use,”97 and the
                                           
93 See MUSYA, NFMA, FLPMA, and their associated case law for statutory authority
of US public land agencies to manage for multiple uses.  Described in Dana and Fairfax,
Forest and Range Policy, Its Development in the United States..
94 Reg J. Birchfield and Ian F. Grant, Out of the Woods : The Restructuring and Sale
of New Zealand's State Forests (Wellington [N.Z.]: GP Publications, 1993).
95 See generally Bührs and Bartlett, Environmental Policy in New Zealand : The
Politics of Clean and Green?  P. A. Memon, Keeping New Zealand Green : Recent
Environmental Reforms (Dunedin, N.Z.: University of Otago Press, 1993), Young, Our
Islands, Our Selves : A History of Conservation in New Zealand.
96 seasonal sheep grazing
97 s.24(a)(ii) CPLA 1998 No 65
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Crown recovers unencumbered possession of the land with “significant
inherent values” worthy of protection.98
Why undertake a simultaneous land disposition and acquisition
program by trading property rights?  Legislation presents multiple goals: 1)
allow farmers to make land more sustainably productive by intensifying land
use and also discouraging rabbit infestation;99 2) secure the public’s right to
“wander at will” in the high country without asking permission of the farmer
with exclusive occupation rights;100 3) protect ecological, landscape, and
heritage values by excluding sheep, and engaging in other management
strategies of DOC; 4) divest the Crown of productive assets and get the
Crown out of the business of farm administration, in keeping with the
neoliberal state sector reforms of the 1980s.  In short, the aim of land tenure
reform is “to achieve more productive economic land use and conservation
outcomes in the South Island high country.”101
In short, the Crown is trading and redistributing property rights, or
“sticks”, in order to change land use.  The government could have sought to
achieve these goals legislatively or administratively – by changing the terms of
the Land Act or the individual leases themselves.  But Parliament initiated a
transfer of property rights to achieve the stated land use goals, reasoning that
the Crown and the lessee could best pursue their separate conservation and
production goals separately – unencumbered by reciprocal property rights
claims.  The land tenure reform process redistributes the sticks and transfers
rights in order to deliver two complete bundles of sticks – one bundle to the
Crown to be managed by DOC, and one to the lessee with freehold, fee-
simple title.
This chapter first reviews the abstract theory of property as a bundle of
sticks, then delves into the current distribution of sticks in NZ’s pastoral estate,
                                           
98 CPLA §24(b)
99 According current Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, and former
director of the Rabbit Land Management Programme.
100 New Zealand is a country where the current Prime Minister is well-known to be an
avid outdoorswoman, and where “Outdoor Recreation” is the name of part of a political party.
101 Cabinet Business Committee, "Cabinet Business Committee Minute of Decision,"
(Wellington: Cabinet Office, 2003). quoted at Brookers Looseleaf Legal Service, "Land Law,"
11.25.01.
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and describes how they are being redistributed under the 1998 statute.  In
examining the results of the reforms to date, it uncovers questions about the
relative value of actual  vs. potential property rights.  Finally, in light of the lack
of clarity in government policy on this question, I suggest a greater role for the
Court and some alternative policy mechanisms for achieving the desired
changes in land use.
The mechanics of distribution and redistribution of property rights
This work relies on the view of real property as a collection of rights,
not a thing.  Since the 1880s many property scholars and jurists have come to
consider property not as a physical object, but as a collection of rights and
duties.102  Modern property law views property as highly divisible – very
differently from the traditional Blackstonian view of property as a singular,
physical, indivisible entity.103  In this view, “property is best described as a
social relationship giving an owner power over other individuals that restricts
their control or use of an item or resource.”104
Property is not land, a car, or a pair of trousers.  Rather it is an
assemblage of what one can and cannot do with the land, car, or trousers.
One may wear the trousers, but may not strangle someone with them.  One
may drive the car, but not while drunk.  And land is the most complicated of
all, with many zoning, environmental, and other laws that overlay land
ownership and restrict the uses in which the landowner may engage.  And
limitations on use also limit the financial value of ownership.  A car without an
engine has little value.
The first use of the term “bundle of rights” to describe property appears
to be in 1888:105 “The dullest individual among the people knows and
                                           
102 This allows for ownership of a much wider variety of physical and non-physical
entities, including financial shares, options, security interests, and futures.  Robert Jay
Goldstein, Ecology and Environmental Ethics: Green Wood in the Bundle of Sticks
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 34.
103 Raymond, Private Rights in Public Resources: Equity and Property Allocation in
Market-Based Environmental Policy, 16.
104 Ibid., 41., citing Charles B. McPherson, "The Meaning of Property," in Property:
Mainstream and Critical Positions, ed. Charles B. McPherson (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1978).
105 But the term is usually attributed to Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo or
Professor Wesley Hohfield.   And the concept without the term appeared earlier, as in English
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understands that his property in anything is a bundle of rights.”106  And since
the 1930s, the US Supreme Court has adopted the bundle of rights
description of property over property as singular physical object.107  As such,
property as bundle of rights and duties has come to be the dominant paradigm
in real property jurisprudence in the United States since the 1930s.  The
metaphor108 certainly has its critics, but is so dominant that its critics and
history are often ignored.109
The most important rights contained in the bundle include: use and
control of revenue generated from property; exclusion of others; security of
tenure from forced removal; alienation, bequest, or transfer; and
destruction.110   A complete bundle of sticks includes all 5 listed above,
without qualification.111  Of these, the right to exclude trespassers, or
exclusive occupation in this case, is recognized in case law as “one of the
most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized
as property.”112
                                                                                                                            
judge John Austin’s lecture circa 1828-1832: “It is manifest that the right, though deemed
singular, is truly a collection or aggregate of rights.”
Quoted in Goldstein, Ecology and Environmental Ethics: Green Wood in the Bundle
of Sticks, p 35.
106 John Lewis, A Treatise on the Law of Eminent Domain in the United States (1988).
§ 55 quoted in Ibid.
107 For specific Court references to the bundle of sticks, see: Dolan v. City of Tigard
(512 U.S. 374 (1994)); Coastal Petroleum Co. v. American Cyanamid Co. (492 So. 2d 339
(Fla. 1986)); De Byle’s Inc. v. City of Rhinelander (143 Wis. 2d 894 (Ct of App., 4th Dist.
1988); Debortha v. Sunridge Land Co. Inc. (312 Ore. 307 (Ore. 1989))
all cited in Ibid., p 36.
108 The metaphor “bundle of sticks” goes back to Aesop’s fable in which a bundle of
small twigs is harder to break than a single larger stick.  Ibid., p. 35.
109 Ibid., p 48.
110 Raymond, Private Rights in Public Resources: Equity and Property Allocation in
Market-Based Environmental Policy, p. 17.
111 Ibid.
Raymond notes that licensed property rights (such as grazing or mining permits) have
qualifications on at least one of the sticks – in the US case, it’s security of tenure.  In the US
case, grazing permitees have 10-year permits with a preferential right of renewal.  They have
a strong de facto security of tenure, but have been found by the Courts not to be vested
property rights.  They are somewhat transferable, but only through transfer of the private
“base” property to which the grazing license is affiliated.
112 Dolan v. City of Tigard (512 U.S. 374 (1994))
cited in Goldstein, Ecology and Environmental Ethics: Green Wood in the Bundle of
Sticks.
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Building on the abstract view of property, Raymond (2003) addresses
questions of private interests in public resources relevant to the NZ case.113
He invokes a concept of licensed property,114 a “private legal right that
provides a significant degree of security and exclusivity to resource users but
remains unprotected from future government adjustment or cancellation
without compensation. … The term recognizes that the private rights created
by certain market-based policies are intended to function as a form of private
ownership.”115  Pastoral leases are not a form of licensed property, because
the loss of all or part of a pastoral lease is compensable according to the Land
Act.116  This stands in stark contrast to the property rights created by the US
grazing permits, which are not compensable.117
Crown land, alienation, and the current distribution of property rights
The legal construct issuing grazing privileges to private farmers was
born in New Zealand in 1856, when grazing leases were first established on
the South Island.118  At that time, the Crown held the land in question following
purchases from Ngai Tahu in the 1840s and 1850s.  The tenure of these first
leases ranged from 1 year in the province of Canterbury, to 14 years in
Otago.119  Since 1856, the Crown has used leases and licenses to alienate
the pastoral resource to farmers in order to promote settlement and
development of the South Island high country,120 while avoiding freeholding
                                           
113 for inquiries into this topic, see: S. K. Fairfax et al., "The Federal Forests Are Not
What They Seem: Formal and Informal Claims to Federal Lands," Ecology Law Quarterly 25,
no. 4 (1999), Raymond, Private Rights in Public Resources: Equity and Property Allocation in
Market-Based Environmental Policy.
114 Raymond notes that policies that create licensed property rights are market-based
and are aimed at creating incentives of ownership to “attain environmental improvements”.
They might or might not be transferable.  He also notes that licensed property is “not a term
found in any legal text on property law, nor is it being proposed as such.”  Raymond, Private
Rights in Public Resources: Equity and Property Allocation in Market-Based Environmental
Policy, p. 14.
115 Ibid.
116 s.117(2, 6) Land Act 1948 No. 64
117 Raymond, Private Rights in Public Resources: Equity and Property Allocation in
Market-Based Environmental Policy, p. 14.
118 Broad, "The Changing Role of Government in the Management of Its High Country
Lands."
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid.
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the land deemed as too “fragile” for private ownership.121  These leases and
licenses have varied in form since 1856, but have gradually increased in
length of tenure.  Prior to 1948, leases ran for 21 years, were non-renewable,
and subject to terms of the Land Settlement Board.122  The 1948 Land Act
increased tenure to 33 year, renewable leases, but lacked right to convert to
freehold123 because “the land was considered so environmentally fragile, that
the Crown would not grant a right to freehold and imposed significant
restrictions upon its use.”124
Looking at the successive Land Acts and amendments from 1856
through 1998,125 it seems that questions of productivity and sustainability in
the high country have always been intermingled with questions of tenure,
property rights, and division of responsibility for productivity and sustainability
among the lessee and the Crown.126  Indeed according to a former adviser to
Minister of Lands Dennis Marshall (sponsor of CPLA) and current DOC
staffer, "it is difficult to avoid the suspicion that by 1920, insecurity of tenure
had become a general scapegoat for all the ills of the high country, in fact,
part of the high country mythology."127   And the definitive land law text in New
Zealand describes the politics of pastoral leases as: “The creation and reform
of Crown pastoral leasese reflects the ongoing debate about whether public or
private ownership achieves the best management and use of high country
                                           
121 Commissioner of Crown Lands, "The Tenure of Crown Pastoral Land, the Issues
and Options: A Discussion Paper," (Wellington: 1994). citing Hansard, November 24, 1948,
page 3999
122 Brookers Looseleaf Legal Service, "Land Law," 11.22.02.
123 some leases allow the lessee to purchase the lessor’s “reversion” at the end of the
lease, effectively buying out the lessor’s interest and converting to fee-simple ownership.
Ibid., 11.14.01.
124 S.D. Brown, "Crown Pastoral Lease Tenure: A Catalyst or Constraint?," NZ
Valuers' Journal 17 (1995). quoted in Brookers Looseleaf Legal Service, "Land Law,"
11.22.02.
125 see increasing strength of tenure at each iteration of distribution of the pastoral
resource in: Land Acts and Amendments of 1877, 1882, 1885; Land Act of 1948; and CPLA
1998
126 Broad, "The Changing Role of Government in the Management of Its High Country
Lands," p. 8 and 32.
127 H. Blake, "Pastoral High Country, Proposed Tenure Changes, and the Public
Interest," in Lincoln Papers in Resource Management (Christchurch: Centre for Resource
Management, Lincoln College, 1983). quoted in Broad, "The Changing Role of Government in
the Management of Its High Country Lands," p. 33.
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pastoral land.”128  Almost throughout the history of pastoral leases in New
Zealand, the standard argument put forth by lessees was that the Crown did
not offer secure enough tenure to provide incentive for farmers to improve the
land and achieve maximum productivity.129
In their current form, pastoral leases are contractual agreements
between the Crown (lessor) and the lessee, granted by the Commissioner of
Crown Lands (Commissioner).130  The Commissioner is responsible for the
pastoral estate, and he delegates that power and function to the Crown
Property Management Group of LINZ, in Wellington.131  The leased land is a
type of Crown land classified as “pastoral”, or "land that is suitable or
adaptable primarily for pastoral purposes only."132  Other classes of Crown
land, such as farm, urban, or commercial/industrial, support other, non-
pastoral, uses.  The pastoral classification restricts the lessee to pastoral use,
and requires prior consent by the Commissioner for other, non-pastoral, uses.
But this does not absolutely prohibit the leaseholder from engaging in
ecotourism133 while under lease, for example.  He may, if he gets consent
from the Commissioner.  As such, the Crown controls usufructuary property
rights to all non-pastoral uses, but on occasion may alienate a right to the
farmer to engage in a certain approved non-pastoral use.  By many accounts,
the Crown has been a generous landlord, frequently granting consents for
non-pastoral uses, and perhaps diminishing others’ perception of its control
over those property rights.
The leases are a form of Crown land, defined as "vested in her Majesty
which is not for the time being set aside for any public purpose or held by any
                                           
128 Brookers Looseleaf Legal Service, "Land Law," 11.22.02.
129 This argument seems a bit hollow though, given that according to Broad (no date),
between 1924 and 1948, lessees had the opportunity to freehold their properties or to
increase tenure to 70 years, yet only 10 of the 350 took advantage of the freehold
option.Broad, "The Changing Role of Government in the Management of Its High Country
Lands," p. 33.
130 under §66 of the Land Act of 1948, repealed and replaced by CPLA §4(a-d)
131 Brookers Looseleaf Legal Service, "Land Law," 11.22.03.
132 §51(1)(d) of the Land Act (Later amended and repealed by CPLA §102, 104, 194
(1998 No. 65))
133 for example, §106A allows for recreation permits for commercial recreation on
pastoral land
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person in fee simple."134  But the land is not public, because the lessee’s right
of exclusive occupation precludes the public’s free access without consent of
the lessee.  The lessee can also sell or transfer his lease with the
Commissioner’s consent.135  And the lessee holds these rights virtually in
perpetuity, as the leases are perpetually renewable, with the Crown only able
to change the rent.  However the Crown has a reversionary interest in the
pastoral land, meaning that the asset reverts to the Crown upon termination of
the lease or if the lessee breaches the terms.136  “In principle, a pastoral lease
or license could be terminated by the Crown for breach of covenant by the
grantee.  Such an occurrence is, however, unreported.”137
A pastoral lease is a form of "alienation", or "limited disposal", of Crown
land.138  As such, pastoral lease land falls into the category of alienated
Crown land,139 but not fee simple, or “freehold”, land.  Hence the land belongs
to the Crown, but several of the resources, including exclusive occupation,
have been alienated to private interests.
The rights and responsibilities conferred by pastoral leases stem from
five sources: the lease; Land Act 1948; CPLA 1998; Crown Pastoral Land
Standards (non-binding guidelines for property management written by
Property Regulatory Group at LINZ and the Commissioner); the common law
of leases and licenses.140  Sections 51-167 of the Land Act of 1948 govern the
                                           
134 Land Act §2.  Also Part 6(129)(2)(e) of the TE TURE WHENUA MAORI ACT
1993/MAORI LAND ACT 1993 adds to the Land Act definition: ”Land (other than Maori
customary land and Crown land reserved for Maori) that has not been alienated from the
Crown for a subsisting estate in fee simple shall have the status of Crown land.”
135 S 89(1) Land Act 1948, and subject to ss 8992, 96-99.  The lessee may transfer
even to Canadian pop star Shania Twain.  See for example, Colin Espiner, "Shania Is Comin'
on Over ..." The Press, 17 SEP 2004 2004.
136 S19 CPLA 1998 allows the Court to terminate a lease upon breach. Brookers
Looseleaf Legal Service, "Land Law," 11.24.05.
137 Ibid., 11.1.
138 Land Act §2
139 Land Act §176 offers a very strong defense of Crown assets and resources held
on Crown lands.  It prohibits trespass by people, stock, or animals, and bars the removal of
timber, bark, flax, guano, and mineral resources.  But this section refers only to Crown land
that is not subject to "lease, license, or demise serving to invest the exclusive occupation" of
the land.  So this does not refer to pastoral leases.
140 Brookers Looseleaf Legal Service, "Land Law," 11.24.01.
141 As of 7 Feb., 2005, there were 273, though with ongoing land reform, the number
of leases is diminishing by the month. Cabinet Policy Committee, "Pol(05)14," p. 1..  for the
latest numbers, see
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classification and alienation of Crown land.  The Land Act, modified by the
Crown Pastoral Land Act of 1998 (hereafter CPLA) and other ensuing
statutes, specifies which land interests are held by whom, which interests may
be resumed by the Crown, and when compensation is owed to the lessee or
license holder.  In general, the lease affords the lessee "exclusive occupation
and quiet enjoyment" of the land,144 and exclusive right to pasturage.145  This
means that the lessee is allowed to run a specified number of sheep, and
controls access to the lease land as s/he has the right to exclude
trespassers.146  A pastoral lease runs for 33 years with a perpetual right of
renewal,147 with rent reviews every 11 years.148   The lessee is entitled to
compensation if land is resumed by the Crown, and rent is reviewed every 11
years.   Rent is fixed as a percentage of the land value exclusive of
improvements.  Finally, the lessee may apply for a commercial recreation
operation permit, and may use timber growing on the lease land.
The lessee does not have right to the soil, nor to any use of the land
other than pastoral farming without permission of the commissioner.149  The
lessee is obligated by way of implied covenant150 to farm the land "diligently",
to practice “good husbandry,”151 to keep the land free of rabbits and other wild
                                                                                                                            
http://www.LINZ.govt.nz/rcs/LINZ/pub/web/root/core/CrownProperty/tractivitygraph/index.jsp,
last visited 30 October, 2005
142 Ibid., p. 7.
143 Commissioner of Crown Lands, "The Tenure of Crown Pastoral Land, the Issues
and Options: A Discussion Paper," p. 11.
144 Ibid.
145 Land Act §66(2), repealed and replaced by CPLA §4(a-d)
146 The Trespass Act of 1986 applies to pastoral leases.
147 Land Act § 66(2) stated “A pastoral lease shall entitle the holder to the exclusive
right of pasturage over the land comprised in the lease, and a perpetual right of renewal for
terms of 33 years, but shall give him no right to the soil, and no right to acquire the fee
simple.”  This section was repealed and replaced by CPLA §4(a-d): “A pastoral lease gives
the holder—
(a)The exclusive right of pasturage over the land:
(b)A perpetual right of renewal for terms of 33 years:
(c)No right to the soil:
(d)No right to acquire the fee simple of any of the land.  (Cf 1948 No 64 s 66(2))”
148 for leases granted after 30 November, 1979, rent is set at 2.25% of the value of
the land exclusive of improvements. The Land Valuation Tribunal resolves any disputes over
rent valuation. Brookers Looseleaf Legal Service, "Land Law," 11.24.02.
149 Commissioner of Crown Lands, "The Tenure of Crown Pastoral Land, the Issues
and Options: A Discussion Paper," p. 12.
150 Brookers Looseleaf Legal Service, "Land Law," 11.24.03.
151 Land Act §99 (1)(a-c)
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animals, and to keep the land of the waterways clear of weeds,152 to avoid
committing “waste.”153  As such, the farmer has a positive duty to conserve
the productive values of the land.  But the Land Act is silent on the farmer's
duties regarding the natural, scenic, or cultural values.154
Further, the lessee is also bound by the Common Law Doctrine of
Waste that applies to tenant-landlord situations in which the landlord has a
reversionary interest.  The doctrine prohibits the tenant from damaging the
landlord’s reversionary interest.155  In this case, even if the Land Act did not
require good husbandry, the lessee would still have to protect the leased
asset.
The Crown retains ownership of the land exclusive of improvements,
and continues to charge annual rent.  The Crown also controls the following
land uses: number of stock;156 burning of tussock grasses;157 afforestation;158
non-pastoral commercial activities, including commercial recreation;159
cultivation of crops and grass;160 clearing forest and scrub.161  The Crown may
reclassify the land from “pastoral” to “farm”, or another class, thereby granting
permission to a lessee to pursue other allowed non-pastoral uses.  Although
the lessee may transfer the lease by bequest, sale, or other means, the
Commissioner must approve the transfer162 and may refuse to authorize the
transfer including for reasons of public interest.163
                                           
152 Land Act §99
153 Land Act §99(1)(a)
154 Indeed, this is why conservation advocacy group Forest and Bird joined the
campaign for land reform.  The Forest and Bird magazine called for the following in 1994:
“The 1948 Land Act needs urgent amendment to provide a better procedure for free holding
and protection for land that has high conservation and recreation status.” Sue Mataurin, "High
Country Headway," Forest and Bird, February 1994.
155 see Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, Third Edition ed. (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1986), pp. 34-35, Edward J. McCaffery, "Must We Have the Right to Waste?," in
New Essays in the Legal and Philosophical Theory of Property, ed. Steven Munzer
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
156 Land Act §66(3), repealed and replaced by CPLA §9(1-4)
157 Land Act §106
158 Land Act §108
159 Land Act §66(1), repealed and replaced by CPLA §4
160 Land Act §108
161 Land Act §108
162 Commissioner of Crown Lands, "The Tenure of Crown Pastoral Land, the Issues
and Options: A Discussion Paper," p.. 13.
163 Land Act §89(2)
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An oft-amended clause allows the Minister of Conservation to
designate any Crown land as a reserve "for any purpose which in his or her
opinion is desirable in the public interest"164 even if the land to be reserved is
subject to a pastoral lease.165  Most recently amended in 1994, this section is
silent on the issue of compensation to the lease holder.  Designating land as a
reserve or conservation area might extinguish some of the lessee’s use rights
to the reserve land, as the land would still be retained in Crown control if not
Crown ownership as in a national park.166  But §117(1) authorizes the
Governor-General (appointed by the Queen) to resume any portion or all of a
pastoral lease if "in his [sic] opinion the land is required for a road, or street, or
any public purpose." 167  In the event of a §117 resumption, the lessee is
entitled to compensation for "any improvements belonging to him," "for the
value of his interest in the unexpired term of his lease or license over the land
so resumed,"168 and for "injurious affection" caused by such a resumption.169
The Commissioner contends that the current distribution of property
rights in pastoral leases constrains both parties’ abilities to use the land.  The
Crown’s interest constrains the lessee’s use rights, and that the lessee’s rights
to pasturage and to exclusive occupation constrain the public’s ability to use
and conserve the resources.
The Crown has an interest in production from, and a sustainable
management of, pastoral land, as it has in land on all forms of tenure.
The Crown also has interests in pastoral leases which relate to the
safeguarding of the public interest in such matters as nature
conservation, access, recreation, landscape and historic values.
However, its ability to uphold these interests is constrained by the
rights it has alienated (e.g. exclusive occupation and pasturage), in
                                           
164 Land Act §167(1)  But according to the LINZ General Manager for Policy, NZ
governments are willing to resume land from leases for hospitals and schools, but is less
inclined to do it for reserves and parks.  "This has to do with the Crown's willingness to
exercise its compulsory powers.  Legally, it's an option.  But for this government, as for other
governments, "there is no appetite for it."
165 Land Act §167(3) 
166 Brookers Looseleaf Legal Service, "Land Law," 11.
167 Land Act §117(1)
168 Land Act §117(2)
169 Land Act §117(6)
Brower Fulbright Report 55
perpetuity, to the lessees.  The Crown is obliged to treat the lessee in a
fair and reasonable manner.170
Currently the farmer holds very limited resource use rights, as the Land Act
allows the farmer to pursue only pastoralism.  But the farmer’s right to
exclusive occupation is very powerful, and can interfere with the Crown’s
ability to exercise the non-pastoral use rights that it still holds.  For instance,
the Crown holds the right to subdivide, but cannot act on it while the farmer
holds exclusive occupation.  Similarly, the public has very limited recreation
access rights, as the lessee holds the right to exclude trespassers.  Following
the redistribution, the Crown will resume a complete bundle of use rights to
the land shifting to DOC, unencumbered by lessee’s rights to pastoralism and
exclusive occupation; and the lessee will obtain fee-simple title and its
corresponding complete bundle of rights to his portion of land.
Valuation of the Crown's financial interest:  The Emmerson case
Our description of current property rights arrangements finishes with
the most prominent oft-cited case law in matters regarding the Crown’s
interest in pastoral leases, the Emmerson case.171  In 1998, a pastoral lessee
family, the Emmersons, contested the Crown’s re-evaluation of the farm’s
rent, arguing that the Crown had underestimated the land’s improvements.  As
rent is fixed by statute as a portion of the land exclusive of improvements,172
the Emmersons argued that “improvements” include more than what the
Crown had previously estimated, therefore the lease rental should be lower.
For reference, the average rent paid on a pastoral lease is NZ$6000 per
year,173 or $0.86 per hectare.  Leases range in size from 1000ha, for about
$1500 per year, to 16,000ha for about $10,000 per year.174
At question was, for the purpose of land valuation for rent, whether
                                           
170 Commissioner of Crown Lands, "The Tenure of Crown Pastoral Land, the Issues
and Options: A Discussion Paper," p. 14.
171 According to LINZ General Manager for Policy, case law guides questions of
where the interests in pastoral leases lie.  The most prominent case is Emmerson, but there
are others from the Land Valuation Tribunal.
172 Rent is set according to §131 Land Act 1948, and §6-7 CPLA 1998.
173 For reference, this is less rent than for a flat in Christchurch.
174 Chair Cabinet Policy Committee, "South Island High Country Objectives:  Report
Back," (Office of Minister for Land Information, Office of Minister for Conservation, 2005).
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inputs such as rabbit and weed control constitute “improvements”175 or “good
husbandry” as mandated of the farmer by terms of the Land Act.176  In
Commissioner of Crown Lands v Kinney,177 the Court describes land
exclusive of improvements as “in its natural state.”
In Emmerson, the Dunedin based land valuation tribunal found that
land exclusive of improvements constitutes “the severely depleted state that
would have existed but for the improvements.”178  While the Land Act requires
good husbandry, “improvements” includes the impacts of weed and pest
control that go beyond husbandry.  “The work carried out by the respondents
to combat rabbits and hieracium went far beyond the obligations of good
husbandry and maintenance imposed upon them, principally by §99, and
constituted an improvement in terms of §2 of the Act.”179
The Emmerson decision is informative on the issues of what
constitutes an improvement and how to determine pastoral rents.  But we
must be careful in applying it to the current exchange of use rights.  It clearly
expands the definition of a compensable improvement in determination of
value of the lessee’s interest.  The scope and value of improvements
contribute directly to discussions of relative monetary values of the Crown’s
interest vs. the lessee’s.  But valuation of improvements relies on a physical
view of property, and the redistribution of use rights in land tenure reform is
best viewed within the framework of an abstract bundle of rights.  The physical
concept of improvements is central to determination of rent, but only
tangentially related to land tenure reform.  In land reform, it is use rights being
exchanged, not improvements.
                                           
175 defined in §2 of the Land Act as “substantial improvements of a permanent
character, and includes reclamation from swamps; clearing of bush, gorse, broom, sweetbrier,
or scrub; cultivating of gardens; fencing (including rabbitproof fencing); draining; roading;
bridging; sinking wells or bores … in any way improving the character or fertility of the soil.”
176 Land Act §99(a-c) imposes an implied covenant on the lessee that “he [sic] will …
farm the land diligently and in a husbandlike manner according to the rules of good
husbandry, … keep the land free from wild animals, rabbits, and other vermin, … properly
clean and clear from weeds and keep open all creeks, drains, ditches and watercourses upon
the land.”
177 (1064) NZ Valuer 273@ p 275
178 Emmerson case p 24
179 Emmerson case p 26
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Trading Sticks with the Crown: Land Tenure Reform as Exchange of Use
Rights
At its base, the redistribution process is a bilateral exchange of property
rights:  the lessee relinquishes exclusive occupation and pastoral use rights
on land going to DOC; and the Crown grants the lessee, now landholder, all
non-pastoral use rights (subject to New Zealand’s Resource Management
Act) on land to be freeholded.180  Redistribution takes place within a long
process of consultation between government contractors acting on behalf of
Land Information New Zealand (hereafter LINZ), and DOC, local Maori iwi,
and interested parties such as conservation and recreation groups.181  When
use rights and title change hands, each party buys out the other’s interest,
with the value of each interest determined by negotiation.
So the exchange comes down to trading exclusive occupation and
pastoral use held by the lessee, for all non-pastoral uses held by the Crown.
The non-pastoral uses are actually a bundle of rights as portrayed in Table 3,
rather than a single use right.  But they are only potential use rights, not
actual.  Taking subdivision182 as an example, the lessee’s exclusive
occupation right precludes the Crown from subdividing land held under
pastoral lease.  Similarly, the Crown may not plant a vineyard on land under
pastoral lease.  The Crown holds the non-pastoral bundle of rights, and may
allocate elements of it at will, but it may not exercise any of the rights in the
non-pastoral bundle while the lessee holds the right of exclusive occupation.
So what of the value of these potential rights held by the Crown, and
                                           
180 for a Court discussion of the interaction between the RMA and the farmer’s
newfound subdivision right, see Wakatipu Environmental Society Inc. v Queenstown Lakes
DC [2000] NZRMA 59 at paragraph 124, quoted at Brookers Looseleaf Legal Service, "Land
Law," para.11.24.9.
181 the land tenure reform process is subject to the following NZ legislation: CPLA
1998, Land Act 1948, Conservation Act 1987, Reserves Act 1977, as well as the principles of
the Treaty of Waitangi (s 25(1)(b)). Ibid., para. 11.25.01, 11.25.02.
182 And subdivision is a realistic example, as illustrated in media coverage of the
results of land tenure reform: “Two large blocks of land on the shores of Lake Pukaki with
views to Mount Cook are for sale. The land has been subdivided from Rhoborough Downs
Station and, thanks to the Government's tenure review of high country property, can be sold
freehold. Up for grabs are a 130.5 hectare block and a smaller 61.5ha block. … Pyne Gould
Guinness (PGG) agent Hunter Doig said it was rare for land on the shore of the lake to come
up. "It's on the junction of the turn-off to Mount Cook with absolutely stunning views. We've
had the rough end of 100 inquiries." PGG thought there was potential for tourist
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conveyed to the lessee?  It might be that the lessee’s exclusive occupation
right quells the actual value of the Crown-held non-pastoral bundle until the
conditions of the lease are extinguished.  Once that happens, the value of
those use rights such as subdivision and viticulture explode to life, as
exhibited in Figure 6.
But according to Serkin (2005) “legal realists have long recognized that
‘[a] right is as big, precisely, as what the courts will do.’’”183  And markets have
long realized that value is as big, precisely, as what the buyer is willing to pay.
But in this case there is no market, as neither the lessee nor the government
has any competition in buying out the other’s interest in the lease.  So in this
case the ultimate value paid is determined by negotiations between the lessee
and a government contractor acting on behalf of LINZ.
Table 3: Uses contained in the two bundles under the Land Act, subject to Resource
Management Act
Pastoralism Bundle All-but-pastoralism bundle
Grazing sheep and pastoral uses Subdivision
Exclusive occupation Viticulture
Venison farming
Stock numbers not limited by Land Act
Ski fields
Safari parks
Condominiums
Vehicle testing centers
...
Herein lies the public policy problem that leads to our next set of
questions.  The lessee gains use rights that are hugely valuable when
realized, but are of questionable value while the land is under lease.  This
might lead to the lessee receiving rights for which he does not have to pay.
The Crown fails to capture potential revenue from its assets, and ends up
paying millions of dollars to give away assets with huge potential value, but
perhaps with no actual value while under lease.  The next section examines
the results and cost to date of the reforms, and suggests that the question of
                                                                                                                            
accommodation, a retail complex, subdivision, viticulture or a lifestyle block.”Staff, "Land on
Shore of Lake Pukaki Goes on Market," The Christchurch Press, 19 APR 2005.
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value of potential property rights is one for a Court, not for government
contractors.  And if there is a discrepancy between potential and actual
property values that causes the Crown to fail to capture revenue from
disposing of its assets, the government should pursue a different policy
mechanism.
Results of Land Tenure Reform – Is the redistribution changing land
use?
As of June 2005, 30 pastoral leases had completed the reform under
the CPLA, and 34 had gone through under the administrative process prior to
1998.  154 were in process, and 129 had yet to enter.  Of the 64 completed,
229,652 ha have been converted to freehold and 165,446 ha have been
restored to full Crown ownership.184  This means that 62% of the former
pastoral lease land has gone to freehold, and about 38% has been shifted to
DOC custody and management.  Government officials predicted in 2003 that
by the time the reform is complete, the split will be closer to 50-50.185
Land title and status have changed on almost 300,000 ha, but what of
land use patterns?  With only 23% of the leases eligible for reform having
completed the process, it is too early to evaluate how the South Island high
country landscape will change following land tenure reform.  But Figure 8
shows that many former pastoral leasehold sections are now part of parks,
reserves, and conservation areas.  And Figure 3 is just one data point
indicative of the changing land use from pastoral lease to subdivision,
viticulture, vehicle testing centers, and ski fields.
Results of Land Tenure Reform – At what cost?
This section examines the costs of land tenure reform to date, using
two forms of data – what the government has said, and what it has done
about the relative value of potential vs. actual use rights.  Table 4 illustrates
                                                                                                                            
183 Christopher Serkin, "The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for
Regulatory Takings," Northwestern University Law Review 99, no. Winter (2005): p.680.,
quoting Karl Nickerson Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush 84 (1960)
184 Cabinet Policy Committee, "Pol(05)14," p.3.
The post-CPLA numbers come from the above report, but the pre-CPLA numbers
come from a spreadsheet produced by LINZ and on file with the author.
185 Land Information New Zealand, "Government Objectives for the South Island High
Country:  Report Back to the Chair, Cabinet Policy Committee (Office of the Minister for Land
Information, Office of the Minister of Conservation, Office of the Minister of Agriculture and for
Rural Affairs)." quoted at Brookers Looseleaf Legal Service, "Land Law," p.11.25.01.
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that the Crown is disposing of potentially valuable assets but failing to capture
their value.  This brings up two points regarding the cost of using property
rights to effect land use change: 1) the Crown is disposing of assets without
reaping the benefit; 2) further, the Crown is actually losing money in the deal.
In a concurrent negotiation to the redistribution of property rights, each
party (the lessee and the Crown) buys out the other party’s property interest in
the pastoral land; and the Crown makes land tenure reform sales and
purchases.  Since 1998 when records started, lessees have paid the Crown
NZ$10.8 million;186 while the Crown has paid the lessees NZ$26.28 million to
buy out their interest.187  So in aggregate, the lessees have received more
land than the Crown,188 and have received collectively NZ$15.5 million.  Data
on “equalization payments” are not widely publicized, and only available in
aggregate form.189  Further, this table accounts only for revenues and outlays
for disposition and “purchase” of property rights on Crown land, exclusive of
substantial administrative costs.
                                           
186 listed in LINZ annual reports as “land tenure reform sales”
187 listed in LINZ annual reports as “land tenure reform purchases”
188 A 2-tailed t-test comparing the two samples (freehold hectares from each of 64
hectares, and conservation land yielded from each reveals a p-value of 0.004, indicating that
the two samples are indeed statistically different.
189 While the break-down of hectares in the division of land in each lease is public
knowledge, the equalization payments are confidential.  The only available format for this data
is in annual reports.
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Table 4: Equalization Payments190 (in NZ$000) 1992 - 2005
land tenure reform
purchases Land tenure reform sales
revenue to
Crown
1992none reported separately None reported separately
1993none reported separately None reported separately
1994none reported separately None reported separately
1995none reported separately None reported separately
1996none reported separately None reported separately
1997none reported separately None reported separately
1998 4600 5080 480
1999 1054 1076 22
2000 1888 1567 -321
2001 0 60 60
2002 0 0 0
2003 3824 2554 -1270
2004 7910 2626 -5284
2005 11,618 2912 -8706
Total 30,894 15,875 -15,019
since CPLA 26,294 10,795 -15,499
That the lessees have received the majority of the land and payments
contradicts one government policy on pastoral land distribution and valuation,
which implies that the Crown's bundle of property rights is of equal value to
the lessee's.  This interpretation would seem to assign similar value to the
                                           
190 The equalization payments are listed as land purchases and sales on the pages
listed below in the appropriate LINZ Annual Reports.  Reports from 2000-2005 are available
at
http://www.LINZ.govt.nz/rcs/LINZ/pub/web/root/supportinginfo/AboutLINZ/publications/index.j
sp (last visited 31 October, 2005).  Previous reports are available from LINZ.
Land Information New Zealand, "Annual Report for the Year Ended 30 June 1998  Presented
to the House of Representatives Pursuant to Section 39 of the Public Finance Act 1989,"
(Wellington: Land Information New Zealand, 1998), pp 65, 66, Land Information New
Zealand, "Annual Report for the Year Ended 30 June 1999  Presented to the House of
Representatives Pursuant to Section 39 of the Public Finance Act 1989," (Wellington: Land
Information New Zealand, 1999), 79, 80, Land Information New Zealand, "Annual Report for
the Year Ended 30 June 2000  Presented to the House of Representatives Pursuant to
Section 39 of the Public Finance Act 1989," (Wellington: Land Information New Zealand,
2000), pp 71, 72, Land Information New Zealand, "Annual Report for the Year Ended 30 June
2001  Presented to the House of Representatives Pursuant to Section 39 of the Public
Finance Act 1989," (Wellington: Land Information New Zealand, 2001), pp 69, 70, Land
Information New Zealand, "Annual Report for the Year Ended 30 June 2002  Presented to the
House of Representatives Pursuant to Section 39 of the Public Finance Act 1989,"
(Wellington: Land Information New Zealand, 2002), pp 69, 70, Land Information New
Zealand, "Annual Report for the Year Ended 30 June 2003  Presented to the House of
Representatives Pursuant to Section 39 of the Public Finance Act 1989," (Wellington: Land
Information New Zealand, 2003), 74, Land Information New Zealand, "Annual Report for the
Year Ended 30 June 2004  Presented to the House of Representatives Pursuant to Section
39 of the Public Finance Act 1989," (Wellington: Land Information New Zealand, 2004), pp 49,
50, Land Information New Zealand, "Annual Report for the Year Ended 30 June 2005
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Crown’s potential use rights and actual use rights.
Where the lessee is able to freehold the majority of the lease the
lessee is likely to pay the Crown.  Where a significant portion of a lease
is retained (by the Crown for the conservation estate) the settlement is
likely to require a payment by the Crown.191
By contrast, another government document from the same agency in
the same year asserts that the lessee's interest in the land is of greater value
than the Crown’s.  This alternate interpretation seems to imply that Crown
“control of” potential use rights has far less value than the lessee’s actual use
rights.
96. The assessment of the Crown’s interest in pastoral lease
properties includes the rental flow derived from the lease, control of
non-pastoral commercial uses of the land, control of additional property
rights such as sub-division and the right to protect inherent values on
the land. The assessment of the lessee’s interests includes the right to
pasturage, the right to quiet enjoyment, exclusive possession, a
perpetual renewal lease, and the right to on-sell the lease.
97. From a legal or economic perspective, the nature of these
rights is such that the lessee has the greatest interest in the property.
The common misconception that pastoral lease land is “public land”
may have contributed to a belief that the Crown’s interest is
undervalued.192
The contradiction in these two interpretations reveals some
governmental uncertainty regarding the relative value of the two interests and
of potential vs. actual property rights.  But it is clear that the actual value of the
non-pastoral bundle of uses is greater than the actual value of the pastoral
use, after land tenure reform is complete.  The government reports that new,
non-pastoral, land uses such as subdivision and viticulture have doubled land
values after land tenure reform in some cases, especially in Otago’s Lakes
District around Queenstown and Wanaka.
In the past 10 years the average increase in sale price for all rural land
has been in the vicinity of 30%, whereas freehold pastoral properties
                                                                                                                            
Presented to the House of Representatives Pursuant to Section 39 of the Public Finance Act
1989," (Wellington: Land Information New Zealand, 2005), pp 50, 51.
191 Land Information New Zealand, "Terms of Reference:  South Island High Country
Objectives, Review of Valuation Methodology in Tenure Review," (Wellington: Land
Information New Zealand, 2005), 1.
192 Chair Cabinet Policy Committee, "South Island High Country Objectives:  Report
Back."
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have increased by 115% and pastoral leases by some 179%. Even
more dramatic has been the increase in value of some land adjoining
pastoral leases. Good viticultural land has doubled in value in the last
four years and the value of rural residential land close to tourist resorts
has fluctuated widely over the ten year period and in prime areas has
more than doubled in the last three years. … Demand for pastoral
properties is greater on those properties with special features such as
location, history and other SIVs [significant inherent values for
conservation, recreation, or cultural heritage]. … There is a spectrum of
land prices paid for pastoral leases, from the highest prices paid in the
Otago Lakes District, through to those paid in the area of Lake Dunstan
through to Alexandra. Sales in the Lakes District have been focused on
Queenstown and Wanaka, where the sale prices reflect an investment
in real estate, rather than the economics of pastoral farming, although
there have been occasional sales of this type in the other regions. 193
As such, non-pastoral land uses yield higher resale land value than pastoral
uses.  Government documents are clear that in a modern real estate market
where pinot noir and lifestyle blocks net more than merino wool, non-pastoral
use rights are more valuable than the pastoral.  And Figure 2 and Figure 6
reveal that, once actualized after land reform, use rights for subdivision,
viticulture, etc. become very valuable to the new freehold owner.  But
government policy is less clear on the relative values of the potential vs actual
property rights.
Despite policy confusion, the quantitative results of land tenure reform
demonstrate that in recent negotiations, the lessee’s bundle of property rights
is valued far more highly than the Crown’s.  This seems to indicate that the
Crown is willing to sell the potential rights to subdivision, etc. for very little,
because they are only potentialities.  But this has not always been so.  It is
only in 2003 that the difference between land purchase costs and sales
revenues becomes marked.  Perhaps earlier land tenure reform deals
afforded fairly equally value to the Crown’s property rights and the lessee’s,
however as the particularistic data is classified by the government under § of
the Official Information Act.
Policy alternatives and the role of the Court
This leads to two more points regarding the law and policy of property
rights and land use: 1) as the government is unclear about the relative values
                                           
193 Ibid., p 2.
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of actual vs. potential property rights, this question should be addressed by
the Court, not by government contractors or even by LINZ officials negotiating
on behalf of the Crown.  2) Given the lack of clarity and the Crown’s
quantitative failure to capture the benefits of land disposal, the government
should consider other policy mechanisms to change in land use at less cost.
After reviewing the desired changes in land use defined in statute, this section
lists a few possible alternative mechanisms to achieve those goals.
CPLA governs the redistribution of property rights to achieve four
goals: 1) to foster high country management patterns that are “ecologically
sustainable;” 2) to free lease land “capable of economic use” from “current
management constraints” of the Land Act that prohibit all non-pastoral uses;
3) to protect significant inherent values “preferably” by restoring it to full Crown
ownership; and 4) to “secure public access and enjoyment” of the high
country.194  Ecologically sustainable land use is the primary goal, as the law
states that the others are all subject to the first.  While ill-defined at best,
ecological sustainability in the high country involves a more diverse suite of
land uses than just sheep grazing, according to the Rabbit and Land
Management Task Force whose work fed into the inception of land tenure
reform.195  As such, diversification of land use is a primary goal of land tenure
reform.
How might the government simultaneously allow for land use
diversification on productive land, while protecting conservation values and
providing universal recreation access to land with “significant inherent
values”?
1) Involve the Courts: When policy is unclear, let the Courts decide.
Perhaps the simplest option, this would maintain the current
mechanism of redistributing property rights but change the
administrative arrangements.  Currently, the redistribution and
determination of equalization payments take place in a process of
                                           
194 Each of the Cabinet reports cite these goals as the first four “high country
objectives.”  But these 4 goals mirror the objectives of the CPLA §24.
Cabinet Business Committee, "Cbc Min (03) 10/3," p. 2.
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consultation between LINZ contractors and the lessee, DOC,
Maori, and other interested parties.  LINZ is simultaneously a
negotiating party with a vested interest, and the referee in charge
of the process.  This option would place the judiciary, rather than
LINZ, in the role of referee in charge.  It could make use of the
existing Land Valuation Tribunal196 or the Environment Court for
this.  This would enhance the role of the Court in determining
relative value of potential vs actual property rights, rather than
leave it to the negotiating powers of lessees and LINZ.  It would
also relieve LINZ of the conflicting roles of representing the
Crown’s interest while administering the process itself.  This
option is discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 4.
2) Buy and sell:  The Crown could buy the entire lease, using the
existing mechanism of the government’s Nature Heritage Fund for
whole property purchase.  Following the purchase, the
government could identify the significant inherent values worthy of
protection by a similar consultation process as in the existing land
tenure reform.  As the government would be the holder of the
complete bundle of rights, identification of protected land would
not be constrained by the lessee’s interest.  After reserving some
land for DOC, the government could sell the remaining land
“capable of economic use” at auction.  This would allow a market
mechanism to determine the value of potential and actual property
rights, rather than a private negotiation.  It would also increase the
likelihood of the Crown capturing potential value from the assets
which it is disposing.  Though the initial cash outlay for the whole
property purchase would be high, figures 2 and 6 suggest that the
revenues generated at auction would likely be higher.
3) Create reserves and amend Land Act: The Land Act gives
                                                                                                                            
195 Interview with Parliamentary Commissioner of the Environment, former Director of
the Rabbit and Land Management Programme.
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ministers and the Governor General authority to create reserves
on land under pastoral lease.  Hence the government could create
reserves on land sections with desired values, and create access
easements across the pastoral land surrounding the reserves.
The Land Act does not require compensation to the lessee for
creation of the reserves themselves, but might require
compensation for any value lost due to the easements or
exclusion of sheep from the reserves.  At the same time,
Parliament could amend the Land Act to allow more uses on
pastoral land – from viticulture to ski fields to golf courses – as
desired by Parliamentarians and as permitted by the
Commissioner and the Resource Management Act.  This option
would not allow for any freeholding, and would likewise not
extinguish the lease over land designated as reserves.  But it
would allow for protection of values, recreation access, and land
use diversification.  The cost would be administrative and any
compensation owed to the lessee.  Ideally, that compensation
would be determined by a Court such as the Land Valuation
Tribunal.
4) Buy some and amend:  The government could buy out the
lessee’s interest in land deemed to be of conservation, recreation,
or heritage value, and thus regain fee simple title (or “full Crown
ownership) to land going to conservation.  As a condition of the
government purchasing the lessee’s use rights, the government
could amend and relax the Land Act’s pastoral requirement,
allowing for diversification but no subdivision.  This would not
allow a freehold option, but would coney many of the  property
rights associated with freehold, and many of the rights in the non-
pastoral bundle desired by lessees.
5) Covenants:  Freehold the entire property, and place conservation
                                                                                                                            
196 The Land Valuation Tribunal settles rent disputes.  See
www.linz.govt.nz/rcs/linz/6360/rent_reviews.pdf, cited at Brookers Looseleaf Legal Service,
"Land Law," para. 11.24.02.
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covenants and access easements on land desired for
conservation and recreation reasons.  Enforcement of these
covenants would require more and different governmental and
non-governmental regulatory infrastructure than is currently extant
in New Zealand.  The Crown would capture more revenue this
way, and would certainly meet diversification goals, but the
conservation and recreation access might be less than secure
under current regulatory structures.
These are just a few options, briefly presented.  Each would have
proponents and opponents, and costs and benefits.  It is not an exhaustive
list, but merely suggests that there are alternatives.
Conclusion
Redistribution and exchange of property rights can be tools for several
ends related to land tenure and the multiple use paradigm: clarity of tenure;
neat separation of resource uses; diversification of land use; clear
conservation mandate on conservation land.  This paper asks how the
process is going in New Zealand, in light of an abstract view of property.
New Zealand is using property rights as a tool to change land use
patterns in the high country of the South Island.  This paper has examined the
property rights redistribution mechanism, taken a brief look at changing land
uses, evaluated the cost of such a scheme, and proposed policy alternatives.
In terms of resource use, there are three sticks being traded in land tenure
reform: diversification of land use beyond pastoralism, exclusive occupation,
and pastoral use.  The Crown holds the first, while the lessee holds the latter
two.  But there is uncertainty in government policy about the relationship
between the exclusive occupation right and other potential use rights held by
the Crown.  One government document seems to indicate that potential use
rights have similar value to actual use rights, while another implies that
potential use rights have very little value – that exclusive occupation
effectively quells the value of the Crown’s potential use rights.  But the results
to date of land reform are clear.  Redistribution of property rights is changing
land uses, but the New Zealand government is paying millions of dollars to
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dispose of potentially valuable resources.
The apparent uncertainty regarding the value of potential vs. actual use
rights seems to be causing the government to fail to capture the revenues
from the disposition of potentially valuable resources.  Given the uncertainty
and its apparent results, the government should look to the Courts for
guidance and consider other policy options.
Figure 6: Empirical valuation of newly freeholded pastoral land: 8ha for $320,000 near
Wanaka.
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Chapter 5
Who is sticking up for the Crown?
The myth of apolitical administration in New Zealand land
tenure reform
Introduction
The politics-administration dichotomy is alive and well in New Zealand.
The oldest trick in the public administration book of theory, the dichotomy has
enjoyed a “reinvigoration” since the 1980s in the forms of managerialism,197
neo-managerialism,198 New Public Management,199 and the business model of
government.  Managerialism and its progeny have their roots in a strong
ideology200 in which management is good, will render clear objectives,
motivated staff, fiscally responsible actions, elimination of red tape, and yield
fair and uncaptured policy results.  All of this will be achieved by applying
business practices to the public sector.201  Drawing from the principles of
scientific management,202 this "new-Taylorism" described by Pollitt has been
coupled with the philosophy of public choice, transaction cost economics, and
agency theory to form what Terry calls "neo-managerialism” and what Boston
and others call New Public Management.  This latter form, with its triumvirate
of theoretical underpinnings, drives the reformed civil service of New Zealand
today.203
This chapter asks what happens when the goals and administrative
tools shared by the older dichotomy and the newer “managerialist” split are
applied to a process of redistribution of government-owned natural resources.
                                           
197 Chad Kniss, "Book Reviews: Managerialism by Mark Considine and Martin
Painter, Melbourne University Press (1997)," Journal of Public Administration Research and
Theory (1999). citing Mark Considine and Martin Painter, Managerialism (Melbourne:
Melbourne University Press, 1997).
198 Larry Terry, "Administrative Leadership, Neo-Managerialism, and the Public
Management Movement," Public Administration Review 58, no. 3 (1998).
199 Jonathan Boston et al., eds., Reshaping the State : New Zealand's Bureaucratic
Revolution (Auckland, N.Z: Oxford University Press, 1991).
200 Described clearly in Christopher Pollitt, Managerialism and the Public Service: The
Anglo-American Experience (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990), ch.1.
201 Ibid., 7., cited in Terry, "Administrative Leadership, Neo-Managerialism, and the
Public Management Movement," p. 196.
202 Frederick Winslow Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management (New York
London: Harper & Brothers, 1911).
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It finds that the goal of avoiding agency capture by producers, special
interests, or rent-seeking legislators may well be sound.  But the models’
assumptions that insulating administrators from the storms of politics a) is
possible and b) will produce less biased results did not hold true.  Hence in
the case of NZ land reform, the administrative tool of a functional split
between policy and operations in the pursuit of administrative neutrality seems
to have produced results which are more biased towards the production
(sheep farming) interest than predicted either by government policy,204 by or
interest group theories of agency capture205 and public choice.206
One of the goals207 of NZ’s managerialist reforms was to avoid or at
least minimize “bureaucratic or producer capture” of agency activities by
separating commercial from non-commercial functions of agencies, and by
separating policy from operations.208  Several of the features of NZ’s New
Public Management as described by Boston et. al. (1991 and 1996) are
plainly in evidence in land tenure reform including: “an emphasis on
management rather than policy, in particular a new stress on management
                                                                                                                            
203 Boston et al., eds., Reshaping the State : New Zealand's Bureaucratic Revolution.
204 see quote at footnote 191
205 Agency capture describes a situation in which a particularistic interest -- political,
economic, or both – co-opts an agency’s activities and decisions.  See generally Philip
Selznick, Tva and the Grass Roots : A Study of Politics and Organization, California library
reprint series ed. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980).
206 When public choice theory considers interest group politics, it predicts that
organized groups who advocate for measurable benefits to a concentrated group of people
will win over advocates for “public goods” which benefit a diffuse group that is difficult to
identify.  Hence public choice theory has constructed mechanisms, such as the policy-
operations split, to avoid this almost inevitable “producer capture” of policy and its
implementation.  According to public choice theorist Eskridge, "Although the interest group
model of the legislative market is necessarily hedged with caveats and expressed in terms of
probabilities, its general thrust is pretty grim.  The legislative market is one that works badly.
The public goods that government ought to be providing ... are seldom passed by the
legislature, because demand for them is ususally not strong and legislators gain too little from
sponsoring them ... Conversely, rent-seeking statutes -- primarily, concentrated benefit,
distributed cost measures -- seem inevitable."
W. Eskridge, "Politics without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for
Statutory Interpretation," Virginia Law Review 74 (1988). quoted in D.. Farber, "Politics and
Procedure in Environmental Law," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 8, no. 1
(1992).
207 Boston lists all the reform’s goals as: “consistency, accountability, transparency,
contestability, complementarity, coordination, economy, efficiency, the minimization of
capture, and improved bureaucratic representation for disadvantaged groups.” Boston et al.,
eds., Reshaping the State : New Zealand's Bureaucratic Revolution, p. 239.
208 Ibid., p. 239, 40. citing State Services Commission, "Financial Management
Report," (Wellington: 1988).
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skills in preference to technical or professional skills; … the devolution of
management control; … the disaggregation of large bureaucratic structures
into quasi-autonomous agencies, in particular the separation of commercial
from non-commercial functions and policy advice from policy implementation;
[and] a preference for private ownership, contracting out, and contestability in
public service provision.”209
According to Boston,210
A central feature of [the 4th] Labour [government]’s machinery of
government changes was the separation of the provision of policy
advice from the provision of services (and from regulatory or review
functions).  The chief rationale for embracing the functional approach
lies in the argument that it reduces the potential for the policy advisers
to be ‘captured’ by those delivering the services which the government
‘purchased’.  As the Strategos Report on Defense puts it: ‘Policy and
advisory roles ought to be separated from the administrative and
operational aspects of each department … to ensure that there is no
monopoly on policy advice, and more importantly to ensure that policy
is not the exclusive preserve of the operational agency.’
Many of the features of New Public Management, managerialism, and
public choice resemble and rely on the maxims of the politics-administration
dichotomy.211  The age-old dichotomy and the newer policy-operations split
                                           
209 Boston et al., eds., Reshaping the State : New Zealand's Bureaucratic Revolution,
p. 9.
210 Ibid., p. 258-9.
Boston lists other goals of the policy-operations split as including: “cost-effectiveness,
responsiveness to clients, contestability in provision of services, the desire to encourage
citizen participation, and … [giving] expression to different cultural values. …Those committed
to radical democratic principles and the devolution of service delivery to local and regional
government … will necessarily favour the decoupling of policy advice and policy
implementation.”
211 Scholars commonly attribute the dichotomy to early scholars Woodrow Wilson
(1887), Goodnow, and White (1926), though Svara (2001) and O’Toole have argued that their
predecessors did not advocate for such a strict dichotomy as is now portrayed.  Wilson’s
maxim “administrative questions are not political questions” embodies the dichotomy.  Its
historical roots lie in the "emphasis on separation and insulation of administrators from
political interference." (Svara 2001)  In practice, while the civil service reforms of the 1870s
and 1880s did away with the spoils system and formed the philosophical underpinnings of the
dichotomy, the reforms of the Progressive era in the US institutionalized it.  Reforms
associated with the dichotomy included: systems civil service merit and position classification;
political neutrality; "rationalization" of budgets; and efforts to implement Frederick Taylor’s
principles of "scientific management." (Rosenbloom 1993, citing Doig 1984)   The dichotomy
was in part intended to remedy the spoils system, reasoning that depoliticizing the public
service would avoid administrative political favours, and lead to more fair governance.
According to Rosenbloom (1993):
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share implementation goals, underlying assumptions, and administrative tools.
They aim to avoid agency capture in any form – by rent-seeking legislators,
interest groups, or industries.  They assume that a politically neutral and
autonomous policy implementation branch of the civil service will deliver
unbiased, uncaptured results.  And they adopt the administrative tool of a
functional split described in various terms – politics vs. administration in the
separation of powers, policy vs. operations, and policy advice vs.
implementation.  Hence the old and new theories in turn share several
assumptions about removing politics from administration: 1) that it is possible;
2) that it will lead to unbiased, uncaptured results; 3) that unbiased results are
universally and measurably better – more fair or just – than the alternative.
But Boston contends that splitting policy (policy advice) and operations
(implementation) will achieve little in minimization of capture, as it only
addresses capture by producers, not by ideology, clients, or expertise.212
Boston attributes the over-emphasis on producer capture to the managerialist
reliance on public choice theory, and its prediction that production-oriented
commercial interests who benefit a concentrated group of people will win over
a more diffuse, or public, interest.213  Boston suggests that agency capture by
production interests is not as serious of a problem as public choice predicts,
but “to the extent that … capture … is a problem, the remedy lies in a
combination of institutional pluralism, multiple advocacy,214 internal and
external mechanisms for vetting departmental advice, the use of consultative
                                                                                                                            
“The dichotomy was a weapon in a monumental struggle between 'two thoroughly different
systems of political ethics' (Hofstadter 1955 p 9; Rosenbloom 1971 chap. 3).  Depoliticization
of the public service was intended to deprive political bosses of patronage, which was viewed
as their key resource.”
212 Boston et al., eds., Reshaping the State : New Zealand's Bureaucratic Revolution,
p. 260.
213 Ibid., p. 261.
214 similar to Culhane’s multiple clientelism Paul J. Culhane and Resources for the
Future, Public Lands Politics: Interest Group Influence on the Forest Service and the Bureau
of Land Management (Baltimore: Published for Resources for the Future by Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1981).
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arrangements, and maximum government openness.215  In general, it is not to
be found in functional separation.”216
Despite its endurance and modern resurgence, the politics-
administration dichotomy is a false one, and even its creators did not
advocate its strict and simplistic application to governance.217  According to
O’Toole:218
Today, nearly every student of American public administration is taught
the bankruptcy of the simple version of the dichotomy. ... In short, the
dichotomy has collapsed ... Yet … it would be incorrect to conclude that
these constructs are merely fictions or dogmas that paraded as truths
in an earlier era but have served no useful purpose.  Rather, these
ideas helped earlier generations of reformers fashion an administrative
state.
The endurance of the dichotomy in the psyche of civil servants and in
modern theories indicates that its effects still bear examination, even more
than a century after its inception.  This article examines application of the
politics-administration dichotomy and the modern policy-operations split to the
governance of land reform in New Zealand, and cautions that public
administration theorists should be careful what they wish for.  Aiming to create
a neutral policy administration by insulating administrative operators from
political interference and creating a functional split between politics and
administration can backfire.  Whether using an administrative tool of a split or
a dichotomy, assuming that administrative neutrality exists and will produce
an uncaptured result can result in just the opposite – the Crown giving
valuable property rights in land to the dominant interest, and simultaneously
paying them to take it.
Background
New Zealand is engaging in land reform to divide Crown land currently
                                           
215 B. Schaffer, "Brownlow or Brookings: Approaches to the Improvement of the
Machinery of Government," New Zealand Journal of Public Administration 24 (1962).
216 Boston et al., eds., Reshaping the State : New Zealand's Bureaucratic Revolution,
p. 262.
217 J.H. Svara, "The Myth of the Dichotomy: Complementarity of Politics and
Administration in the Past and Future of Public Administration," Public Administration Review
30, no. 6 (2001).
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leased to pastoral farmers for sheep grazing into two categories of land
tenure: 1) full Crown ownership in which leasehold rights have been
extinguished, and which is managed by the Department of Conservation; and
2) freehold (or fee-simple) title coneyed to the farmer, on which pastoral
restrictions on land use have been extinguished.219  Land tenure reform is an
exercise in redistribution of property rights in order to pursue both
conservation and diversification of commercial land use, simultaneously but
on separate parcels of land.220
Currently, the land is owned by the Crown, but the pastoral and
exclusive occupation (or residential) use rights are alienated to the farmers by
leases governed by the Land Act of 1948.  The leases create a confusing web
of compensable property rights, financial interests, and public and private
claims in Crown-owned land.  Governed by the Crown Pastoral Land Act
(CPLA) of 1998 and administered by Land Information New Zealand (LINZ),
land tenure reform redistributes the property rights so that each party221 ends
up with fee-simple title, or a complete bundle of property rights, to a block of
land on which to pursue goals of conservation and recreation or commercial
                                                                                                                            
218 Laurence O'Toole, "Doctrines and Developments: Separation of Powers, the
Politics-Administration Dichotomy, and the State," Public Administration Review 47, no. 1
(1987): p. 23.
219 The goals and parameters of the land reform are stated in §24 of the Crown
Pastoral Land Act of 1998 as:
(a)To—
 (i)Promote the management of reviewable land in a way that is ecologically
sustainable:
 (ii)Subject to subparagraph (i), enable reviewable land capable of economic use to
be freed from the management constraints (direct and indirect) resulting from its tenure under
reviewable instrument; and
(b)To enable the protection of the significant inherent values of reviewable land—
 (i)By the creation of protective mechanisms; or (preferably)
 (ii)By the restoration of the land concerned to full Crown ownership and control; and
(c)Subject to paragraphs (a) and (b), to make easier—
 (i)The securing of public access to and enjoyment of reviewable land; and
 (ii)The freehold disposal of reviewable land.
220 In many ways, land tenure reform follows the model established by New Zealand’s
Fourth Labour Government in 1987 when it disestablished the NZ Forest Service to separate
the commercial timber from conservation pursuits.  It corporatised and later privatized the
National Forest lands whose primary value was for commercial timber production, and shifted
authority over the national forest land containing indigenous forest worthy of conservation to
the newly formed Department of Conservation.220  And the administrative structures that
manage the reform process follow the model of New Public Management, also
institutionalized during NZ’s broadscale reforms of the 1980s.
221 the Crown and the lessee
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production.
The Crown pastoral estate comprises about 2.4 million hectares, or
about 10% of New Zealand.  There are now about 273238 pastoral leases on
the eastern slope of the Southern Alps.  The average size is about 7000 ha.239
The leasehold land collectively supports about 2.8 million sheep, or about 4%
of the national total.  The pastoral estate produces a large portion of New
Zealand's "extra fine” Merino wool, but is quite varied in its pastoral productive
capabilities, from the highly productive low lands up to land above 2000m in
altitude with little to no productive capacity.240
Slowly, farm by farm, the lessees are entering negotiations with the
Crown in which the property rights are redistributed with the end goal of
separating land uses – privatizing land “capable of economic use,”241 and
reasserting Crown authority over land with “significant inherent values”242 for
conservation, recreation, heritage, and landscape.243   As of June 2005, the
Crown has conveyed freehold title to 58% of the land that has undergone
review, or 229,652 hectares.244  And DOC has received 42%, or 165,446
                                           
222 Seth Robson, "Survivor of a High-Country Showdown," The Press, 1 November
2003 2003, p. 10.
223 Land Act §66
224 Land Act §51
225 Commissioner of Crown Lands, "The Tenure of Crown Pastoral Land, the Issues
and Options: A Discussion Paper," p. 11.
226 Land Act §66 (2)
227 Commissioner of Crown Lands, "The Tenure of Crown Pastoral Land, the Issues
and Options: A Discussion Paper," p. 12.
228 Ibid., p.13.
229 Land Act §89(2)
230 Land Act §99
231 Land Act §66 (3)
232 Land Act §106
233 Land Act §108
234 §66 (1)
235 Land Act §108
236 Land Act §108
237 Land Act §117, 167
238 As of 7 Feb., 2005, there were 273, though with ongoing land reform, the number
of leases is diminishing by the month. Cabinet Policy Committee, "Pol(05)14," p. 1.
239 Ibid., p. 7.
240 Commissioner of Crown Lands, "The Tenure of Crown Pastoral Land, the Issues
and Options: A Discussion Paper," p. 11.
241 CPLA §24(a)(2)
242 CPLA §24(b)
243 “inherent values” are defined in CPLA §2(15)(a-b)
244 Cabinet Policy Committee, "Pol(05)14," p. 3.
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hectares.
In a concurrent negotiation, each party buys out the other’s property
interest and use rights in the lease land, under §34 CPLA 1998.  To buy out
the Crown’s interest, lessees have paid the Crown NZ$10.8 million since
1998; while the Crown has paid the lessees NZ$26.29 million to buy out their
interest.  In total, the Crown has paid NZ$15.5 million more than lessees have
paid the Crown in “equalization payments.”245  This contradicts the
government’s stated policy of the party who receives more land will owe the
other some money.246
Parliament gave statutory authority to the reforms in the 1998 passage
of the Crown Pastoral Land Act, but the Commissioner of Crown Lands
(Commissioner) actually began redistributing property rights administratively
in 1992.  Land Information New Zealand, or LINZ, runs land tenure reform as
a process of repeated consultations.
The politics-administration dichotomy in land reform: LINZ as neutral
referee
The politics-administration dichotomy is in evidence in three facets of
New Zealand’s land tenure reform process, which are all progeny of the first:
1) the stated neutrality of the agency in charge; 2) the agency’s stated role as
impartial umpire of the process, rather than advocate for the Crown interest;
3) the stated unwillingness to engage in political advocacy for one side,
instead relying on administrative procedure to produce a fair result.
Officials of the Crown agency in charge of land tenure reform, LINZ,
see the agency’s job to be neutral and objective.247  They see their role as
purely administrative, not political.  For the Commissioner of Crown Lands,
                                                                                                                            
The post-1998 numbers come from the above report, but the pre-1998 numbers come
from a spreadsheet produced by LINZ and on file with the author.
245 See Table 4: Equalization Payments (in NZ$000) 1992 - 2005 for detailed figures.
246 “Where the lessee is able to freehold the majority of the lease the lessee is likely
to pay the Crown.  Where a significant portion of a lease is retained (by the Crown for the
conservation estate) the settlement is likely to require a payment by the Crown.”
Land Information New Zealand, "Terms of Reference:  South Island High Country
Objectives, Review of Valuation Methodology in Tenure Review," p. 1.
(see also chapter 4)
247 And many within and outside of LINZ recognize that the agency and its service
providers espouse neutrality in the process, though some recreation – conservation
advocates question whether neutrality is possible and posit instead that LINZ favors farmers.
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politics is "not where I am supposed to be as a public servant."  According to
the manager of Crown Property Management, "LINZ is a public agency.  We
do what government asks us to do.  We are a neutral public service.
Neutrality is just a basic tenet of public service.  The State Sector Act [of
1988] compels us to be neutral."
Land tenure reform resides in the technical, so-called apolitical,
implementation side of the policy-operations split.  Although government
officials and contractors are making and implementing inherently political
choices, the policy-operations split seems to attempt to somewhat absolve
them of a political role.  Along with numerous political scientists,248 I argue that
such an absolution is not only impossible, but patently ridiculous.  Further, in
this case, an absolution is dangerous, as it is leading to results that appear on
their face to be highly captured.
According to LINZ and its contractors, in land tenure reform LINZ and
its contractors do not take sides – with the farmer nor with recreation –
conservation advocates.249  According to the tenure reform manager in
Christchurch, "We side with the factual information, not with political interests.”
LINZ's position is "straight up the middle.  We don't have an advocacy role on
either side.  We're not advocating for freehold or for conservation.  We are just
administering the law."250  The Commissioner also describes his job as not to
cater to any of the interest groups.  "We’re not going for full-blooded
acceptance; we’re just going to the level of acceptance where people
                                           
248 For example, see: O'Toole, "Doctrines and Developments: Separation of Powers,
the Politics-Administration Dichotomy, and the State.", Colin Campbell and B. Guy Peters,
"The Politics/Administration Dichotomy: Death or Merely Change," Governance 1 (1988), J.A.
Rohr, Ethics for Beaureaucrats: An Essay on Law and Values (New York: Marcel Dekker,
1989), D. Rosenbloom, "Editorial:  Have an Administrative Rx? Don't Forget the Politics!,"
Public Administration Review 53, no. 6 (1993), Guy B. Peters, "The Civil Service in the
Consolidation of Democracy," International Social Science Journal 47, no. 1 (1995), J.H.
Svara, "The Politics - Administration Dichotomy Model as Aberration," Public Administration
Review 58, no. 1 (1998), Kniss, "Book Reviews: Managerialism by Mark Considine and Martin
Painter, Melbourne University Press (1997).", Moshe Maor, "The Paradox of Managerialism,"
Public Administration Review 59, no. 1 (1999), Mark Rutgers, "Splitting the Universe: On the
Relevance of Dichotomies for the Study of Public Administration," Administration and Society
33, no. 1 (2001), Svara, "The Myth of the Dichotomy: Complementarity of Politics and
Administration in the Past and Future of Public Administration."
249 According to a LINZ contractor, "no we are not advocating, and we are not given
a statutory role.  We are melting pot of all information.”
250 Tenure Review Manager in Christchurch
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generally go 'aww yeeeah.'  We’re trying to get the best outcome to meet the
Act, not [the] objectives of lessees or public interest groups.  We have got to
maintain objectivity in even though it is a very subjective matter we’re deciding
on."251  Indeed, chapter 3 of this report highlights the ambiguity of CPLA’s
multiple goals and their amenability to different interpretations by different
political interests.
Many observers of the land tenure reform process describe LINZ’s role
as referee,252 while LINZ officials describe themselves as the “fair umpire.”253
In drafting legislation authorizing the process, LINZ’s role was “envisaged as
the honest umpire who would make the rule."254  As  LINZ is the umpire or
referee, the service providers describe themselves as a "melting pot" of all the
different opinions regarding a pastoral lease.255  The melting pot must be
neutral, not favouring one interest over another.256
According to the Commissioner, passage of the CPLA freed him from
making “political decisions,” and allowed him to be an administrative operator
– making statutory decisions, and just implementing the law.257  Decisions
which had been political prior to CPLA are now administrative.
According to the Manager of Crown Property Management, the land
tenure reform process takes place on the business, or operations, side of a
very clear divide in LINZ between policy and operations.
                                           
251 Commissioner of Crown Lands
While LINZ is not required to achieve consensus, the sooner all parties agree to a
land division, "We are looking for consensus if possible.  If we can get everyone to agree, that
are decisionmaking process becomes much easier, doesn't it?  And In a lot of reviews, we do
get consensus.  We have made some changes in the process which makes the process of
getting to consensus quicker.” (Manager of Crown Property Management)
252 Recreation and conservation advocates
253 Manager of Crown Property Management
254 former policy adviser to Minister Dennis Marshall
255 LINZ contractor
256 LINZ contractor: But "government affirmed on that the Department of lands was
the landholder, and was acting in the Crown's interest as lessor."  It also seemed that "given
DOC 's advocacy role, a separate department would give a more equitable result" than DOC .
"Natural justice suggests that someone with an advocacy role shouldn't be the decision
maker."  The land act required a very definite decision-making role for government because
the Commissioner was the statutory landholder under the land act.  Therefore, tenure review
could never have been configured as a direct negotiation between the farming family and
DOC.
257 “Before the CPLA, the commissioner had to make political decisions.  Now I have
the law to back me up." (Commissioner of Crown Lands)
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There's a split in LINZ between policy and operations, or between
regulatory and business.  The only place where the two sides work
together is through the Manager of Crown Property Management.  …
Yes, there is a clear divide between policy and operations.  … Tenure
review does not take place on the policy side.  Tenure review is an
operational function of our department.  All the Christchurch people and
all the people on this floor [in Wellington] are all operational.
Among New Zealand agencies, this administrative structure is not
unique to LINZ, but became prevalent during the market and administrative
reforms of the 1980s.
This is a stock standard, policy-operations split in New Zealand
agencies.  This split has been around for 20 years now.  It was part of
the 1980s reforms.  All the authority for tenure review has been
delegated to the operations side.  The regulators regulate, and the
operators operate.  But the decisions for tenure review are all made on
the operational side.258
Similarly to the CPLA relieving the Commissioner of the burdens of making a
political decision, rather than administrative, the policy-operations split
enables operators to work “outside the washing machine of politics,”
according to the Tenure Review Manager in Christchurch.
One recreation advocate sees the managerialism within LINZ and its
resulting displacement behaviour as causes for failure of the reform process.
LINZ's myopic, bureaucratic attitude creates results contrary to the
goals of the law and to the stated policy of the government of the day.
The tick-the-box mentality by people with no field aptitude leads to
results that don't meet the objectives of the Act.  The object [for the
bureaucrats] is completion of the process, not the objects of the Act.
This results in a total perversion of the Act. … All they're worried about
is ticking boxes.  Quality of the results is not a concern.259
But according to the Commissioner, the distinctions of politics vs.
administration260 and policy vs. operations must remain strong in order to
avoid agency capture.  "One reason I exist is to stop members of Parliament
from doing favours for their mates with Crown lands."  This neutral stance and
protection against capture is built into the process of repeated consultation
                                           
258 Manager of Crown Property Management
259 interview with recreation advocate
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and innumerable steps described in a 37 page flow-chart261 for service
providers to complete.262  In effect, the process appears to be designed try to
avoid politics altogether.
Agency officials, recreation-conservation advocates, and contractors
state that having a neutral administrative agency in charge (rather than DOC,
an agency with a legal mandate favouring conservation and recreation) is the
best way to achieve a fair and unbiased outcome.263  According to a
contractor, “There's … a sense of natural justice about the process, that an
agency with an advocacy role (DOC) should not be the decision-maker.  You'll
get a more equitable result if the decision-maker does not have an advocacy
role.”264  And a recreation advocate says that LINZ should be (perhaps more)
vigilant at maintaining neutrality: “The decision-maker [LINZ contractor] is in
the middle.  The arrival at an outcome is very much dependent on the
contractor, acting on behalf of the Commissioner.  That's an enormous
responsibility on the contractor to come up with a fair outcome.  This is a one-
off opportunity, once it's in freehold it's not coming back. … In order to get a
fair and unbiased outcome, you need a fair and unbiased LINZ.”265
But striving for a fair outcome by adhering to administrative neutrality
does not allow for any advocacy role for the Crown agency in charge.  And it
does not appear to allow for any politics in the determination of what the
aforementioned “fair outcome” might look like.  But attempting to eliminate
                                                                                                                            
260 Another reference to this split is from the Tenure Review Manager in
Christchurch: "That's a political argument [whether grazing maintains or damages native
grassland ecosystems], and we don't get involved in it."
261 Land Information New Zealand, "Tenure Review Process Operational Guidelines,"
(Christchurch: LINZ, 2004).
262 According to the Commissioner, land tenure reform is a convoluted process
because "it is capable of being sidelined by any of the interests so it has to have a strict
process."  The consultation and information gathering makes it a long process.
263 According to an FMC advocate, LINZ should be neutral because it is deciding on
the fate of crown land that is currently used as exclusive use for a business.  Tenure review is
a means of reallocating land formally vested in the crown into a fairer outcome.  A more fair
outcome is some land becoming truly public, and some land becoming truly private.  That's
why it's so important to get this right.  LINZ administers process, awards contracts, and
ultimately the decision to sign off is the Commissioner's personal decision.  After the
Commissioner has signed, there's no room for appeal.  LINZ says they do their best to be
unbiased.  But you "can't expect them to say anything different, can you?"
264 LINZ contractor
265 FMC representative
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politics on one side of a negotiation all but ensures that the other, avowedly
political, side will win big.  In this case, the Crown agency in charge is also the
statutory representative of the Crown as landholder.  So attempting to take a
neutral stance neutralizes the Crown’s status as landholder.
Some observers of the land tenure reform process think LINZ should
advocate for the Crown interest,266 and many think that LINZ is advocating for
the Crown.267  But contractors and officials are firm in their commitment to a
neutral lack of advocacy for either side.  The contractor has "got to display
impartiality based on the Act."268
And the Manager of Crown Property Management states firmly that his
agency’s role is:
not advocacy.  In fact I would object if you wrote a paper saying that we
advocate in negotiations.  My role is not advocacy.  I operate to comply
with the objects of CPLA.  My position gives the authority to comply
with the objects of part two of the CPLA. … As long as we comply with
the objects of the Act, our jobs are done.  I do not advocate.  My job is
to do this [pointing do his copy of the CPLA].  We work to achieve
government goals, but we do not advocate.269
According to staff, LINZ does not need to advocate for the Crown’s
interest because the Crown interest is written into the CPLA statute and
                                           
266 According to a recreation advocate (a different advocate from the one above who
stated LINZ should be neutral): "LINZ has been given the role as negotiator on the Crown's
behalf.  LINZ's interest in the process are protecting and advocating for the Crown's interest.
LINZ should be doing the job for the Crown.  That's what it's there to do."  (A Forest and Bird
staffer expressed similar sentiments.)
267 interviews with Forest and Bird volunteer; FMC volunteer; recreation advocate
268 LINZ contractor
269 The Manager of Crown Property Management gives an example of working
administratively to achieve government goals of conservation without advocating for
conservation:
“For example, the current government has a goal to create national parks.  Following
the Nature Heritage Fund purchase of Ahuriri, the government set a priority to create Ahuriri
National Park and asked us, can we work to make that happen?  So in order to contribute to
the government goal of creating national parks, we prioritized Dingleburn, Longslip, and Ben
Avon tenure reviews because those stations and conservation land that came out of them
were important to the establishment of the national park.  So in order to accomplish the goal,
we pushed harder to complete these tenure reviews.  Our role is not to push harder for more
conservation land in individual tenure reviews, because we have got to do this [pointing to the
act].  Pushing for more conservation land than is appropriate would violate the Act, but in
order to support the government goal of establishing national parks, we can push harder to
push the tenure review deals through.  In the end, DOC will double the size of the park and be
quite happy.  And so will the government.  By pushing harder to get three reviews through, we
were supporting the government goal to establish the park. … This doesn't mean that we are
pushing harder for more land, we just push harder on the program management side."
Brower Fulbright Report 82
designed into the administrative process of land tenure reform.  Underlying
this is the assumption that the process itself finds the just result, so staff and
contractors do not need to advocate for it.  The administrative realm is quite
capable of producing just results without any advocacy contributions from the
political realm.
Advocating for the Crown is not really with process is about.  It's not
about advocacy.  The process finds outcome.  The outcome is not
predetermined.  The objectives are defined in the CPLA, but the CPLA
enables meeting the objectives, it does not prescribe how to meet
them. … [For example] one objective of CPLA is to ‘make easier the
securing of public access’ [the objective] is not [the actual] securing of
public access itself.  You have to really read the words of the CPLA.
Flexibility has been written into the act.  It if it were a prescriptive act, it
would be an exercise in acquisition.270
In sum, LINZ does not advocate for three reasons: 1) it would violate its
neutral stance; 2) advocacy is DOC’s job, not LINZ’s; 3) LINZ does not need
to advocate because the administrative process produces the results, not
political advocacy.  On top of this procedural reluctance to advocate, LINZ is
prohibited from stating a fixed position on many issues – summer grazing for
example  – because the non-prescriptive nature of CPLA and the rules of the
consultation decision-making process require the agency to look at every
issue on a case-by-case basis.  “If we had a rigid policy, it would be in
violation of the rules of statutory consultation."271
It’s consultation, not negotiation
In line with the professed political neutrality of administrative splits and
dichotomies, the rules of the decision-making process itself – consultation –
prohibit LINZ from advocating.  When promulgating regulations or other
subordinate legislation, New Zealand government agencies traditionally
consult interested272 and affected parties.273  Consultation has been the crux
of land tenure reform since its inception.274
                                           
270 Tenure Review Manager in Christchurch
271 Tenure Review Manager in Christchurch
272 This duty to consult arises from the need to act fairly with respect to the interests.
Queenstown Lakes District Council, "A Guide to Resource Management Act Consultation in
the Queenstown Lakes District," (no date).
273 Commissioner of Crown Lands, "Tenure Review 'Consultation'," (Wellington: LINZ,
2002).
274 Interviews with Commissioner of Crown Lands, and a LINZ contractor
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NZ statute and case law prohibit the agency from entering consultation
with a pre-determined proposal, and direct the agency to maintain a
willingness to change course pending findings in consultation.  A guide to
consultation under New Zealand's Resource Management Act describes
consultation as "a genuine exchange of information between affected and
interested parties, applicants, and decision makers before a decision is
made."275  Consultation thus involves "the statement of a proposal not yet
finally decided upon;... listening to what others have to say in considering
responses;... keeping an open mind and being ready to change in even start
again;... [consultation is] not just a presentation [of a decision] -- it's an
exchange."276
Consultation differs from negotiation,277 in which each party has a
clearly identified desired outcome for which it uses power278 to advocate. 279
Each party in a negotiation then bargains and compromises to achieve a
negotiated outcome, always using veto power -- the ability to leave the
process -- as his most powerful bargaining tool.  While consultation involves
gathering ideas and opinions that contribute to a decision, “negotiation is an
exercise of power, or lack thereof, tempered by a party’s decision whether to
                                           
275 Queenstown Lakes District Council, "A Guide to Resource Management Act
Consultation in the Queenstown Lakes District."
276 Ibid.
277 Consultation and negotiation are different again to mediation, which is “a form of
negotiation, where two or more disputing parties engage in negotiation with the presence of a
neutral third party, a mediator, who assists them in their effort to arrive at a settlement. And,
like negotiation, it is not for every dispute. The parties choose mediation because they want to
settle, they want the privacy of a confidential mediation process, and they see this process as
a way of resolving their dispute more quickly and on their own terms, than would be possible
by going to court, the principal’s office, a discipline board, grievance process, or some other
alternative.   There is usually not a winner and loser, but each side perceives a partial win for
itself. After all, if there were going to be a clear winner, the parties presumably wouldn’t take
the time to engage in mediation.” Bruce Fraser, "The Mediator as Power Broker," in
Negotiation and Power in Dialogic Interaction, ed. Edda Weigand (Philadelphia, PA: John
Benjamins Publishing Company, 2001), p. 31.
There are two factors distinguishing LINZ’s role of referee or umpire from that of
mediator: 1) this is a consultation, not a negotiation; and 2) the two parties (DOC and the
lessee) are not of equal standing, as the lessee has a recognized vested interest while DOC
does not.
278 “… absolute weak parties do not negotiate, they surrender. And, absolutely strong
parties do not negotiate, they conquer” (Nicolaidis 1999: 103) quoted in Ibid., p. 30.
279 The co-director of an advocacy group for lessees, the High Country Accord,
describes land tenure reform as “not a negotiation, but a consultation” in which the Crown
consults with the lessee (and other parties) on “his interests and goals.”
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exercise the power they have. But its success depends critically on parties
who believe they will satisfy their interest better by working together, perhaps
even failing to exercise some of the power they have, than by operating
apart.”280
By contrast, according to the Commissioner of Crown Lands,281 the
highest “statutory duty of consultation is to have an open mind,” to be open to
different opinions, and to be willing to consider the other side.  Consultation is
not about taking sides, but “listening with an open mind and making your own
decision.”282  According to the Tenure Review Manager in Christchurch,
consultation is not a political process like negotiation, in which two parties use
power to battle it out.  But “we do our jobs and advertise outcomes.  We stay
out of the political debate.  The definition of consultation is to seek and
understand all views.”  After the consultation, the contractors “use their
technical expertise” to analyze the advice from all sources and make a
recommendation to LINZ for a decision.283
Following NZ case law, LINZ official documents state in no uncertain
terms that “consultation [is] not to be confused with negotiation or decision
making.”284  While some observers might view the process as a negotiation
between the lessee and DOC, “that’s not true.  Both parties are being
consulted by the contractor.”285  A contractor to LINZ affirms that the process
is most definitely not a negotiation, and certainly not a negotiation between
the farmer and DOC.  The land tenure reform process is an amalgam of
different perspectives brought forth in consultation.  The contractor is the
"melting pot" of views, who puts all the views brought forth in consultation into
the context of all the other views, and put that amalgam of views into context
of the law.  The contractor then issues a report to the assessors at LINZ, who
review the report and make sure that it is factually sound and logically
coherent, checking that the conclusions follow logically from the nominally
                                           
280 Fraser, "The Mediator as Power Broker," p. 30.
281 The Commissioner noted in the interview that he is making reference to the
Wellington Airport case.
282 Manager of Crown Property Management
283 Tenure Review Manager in Christchurch
284 Commissioner of Crown Lands, "Tenure Review 'Consultation'."
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factual findings.286
While case law is not prescriptive as to form or duration of
consultation,287 it is clear that the agency should not have a pre-ordained
decision.288
To consult is not merely to tell or to present. Nor is it, at the other
extreme, to agree.   Consultation does not necessarily mean
negotiation toward an agreement, although the latter not uncommonly
can follow, as the tendency in consultation is to seek at least
consensus.  Consultation is an intermediate stage involving meaningful
discussion. … It is implicit that the party required to consult, while quite
entitled to have a working plan already in mind, must keep its mind
open and ready to change and even start afresh. … Beyond that, there
are no universal requirements as to form. … Nor is there any universal
requirement as to duration.  … Generalities are not helpful.289
The only other directions from case law are that: 1) consultation is to
start at the “formative” stage of decision-making;290 2) and all parties must be
treated fairly.291  In this sense, according to Tenure Review Manager in
Christchurch, if LINZ were to advocate for designating more land for
conservation, it would turn the process into an acquisition exercise and violate
                                                                                                                            
285 Tenure Review Manager in Christchurch
286 A LINZ contractor
287 But land tenure reform consultations do have a series of steps:
1. identify affected parties
2. give them sufficient info to make informed comments
3. “ensure decision maker has all relevant information before him or her” (according
to contractor)
4. allow enough time for public comment
5. allow for comments on the comments
6. “listen to what parties have to say with an open mind (ie be prepared to decide
either way).”  “In consultation, the contractor’s views are not important – the views of the
interested parties are … The contractor’s job is to: develop alternate proposals; elicit the
views of affected parties on these proposals; and present these to the decision maker who
then decides on what proposal to make.”   (according to Tenure Review Manager in
Christchurch)
7.  notify public of decision
G.D.S. Taylor, Judicial Review: A New Zealand Perspective (Supplement to 1991
First Edition) (Wellington: Butterworths, 1997), Commissioner of Crown Lands, "Tenure
Review 'Consultation'." following Taylor, Judicial Review: A New Zealand Perspective
(Supplement to 1991 First Edition).
288 West Coast United Council V Prebble, unreported  J McGechan CP47/88 (1988).
289 Commissioner of Crown Lands, "Tenure Review 'Consultation'." citing Wellington
Interational Airport Ltd V Air New Zealand, 1 NZLR 671 (1993). applying principle from Port
Louis v Atty General of Mauritius.
290 Commissioner of Crown Lands, "Tenure Review 'Consultation'." (citing R v Sutton
London Borough Council)
291 R V Brent London Bureau Council, Ex P Gunning, 84 LGR 168 (QBD) (1985).
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the terms of consultation because LINZ would be adhering to a pre-ordained
decision.292
West Coast United Council v Prebble293 established that “informing”
does not constitute consultation.  Hence DOC’s role in the tenure review
process is not a consultator, but a consultee.  Consulting is also not merely
informing interested parties of a pre-made decision, without willingness to
change position.  “Consulting involves the statement of a proposal not yet fully
decided upon, listening to what others have to say, considering their
responses and then deciding what will be done.”294  Further, “a decision-
maker [in this case the LINZ contractor, and ultimately the Commissioner]
must not have a closed mind to what the person being consulted has to say …
[and] a decision maker must conscientiously take into account what has been
put forward.”295
Hang on, What about DOC?
What about DOC?  If the dichotomous administrative model and case
law definitions of consultation prevent LINZ from advocating for the Crown
interest, it would seem that DOC would stick up for the Crown's interest.
Doesn’t DOC take the political role of “sticking up for the Crown?”  In short,
no.
DOC is not an effective advocate for the Crown for two reasons: 1)
DOC's goals are narrower than the Crown's; 2) DOC has less power than the
Crown because it is not a vested interest, and hence does not have veto
power.  The Department of Conservation's organic act, the Conservation Act
of 1987, authorizes DOC both manage the land it administers “for
conservation purposes”296 and “to advocate the conservation of natural and
                                           
292 Tenure Review Manager in Christchurch (Incidentally, this is likely also the root of
the vertical integration issue in land tenure reform, or a principal-agent problem to a political
scientist, and why Parliament has published the same High Country Objectives repeatedly.
293 West Coast United Council V Prebble.
294 Commissioner of Crown Lands, "Tenure Review 'Consultation'." citing West Coast
United Council V Prebble.
295 Commissioner of Crown Lands, "Tenure Review 'Consultation'." citing Hamilton
City V Electric Distribution Commission, NZLR 605 (1972).
296 The Conservation Act §6(a).  And the Act specifies that “’Conservation’ means the
preservation and protection of natural and historic resources for the purpose of maintaining
their intrinsic values, providing for their appreciation and recreational enjoyment by the public,
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historic resources generally.”297  Just as DOC has management and advocacy
authority for conservation, it has two roles in land tenure reform: advocate for
conservation-recreation in the consultation process; and provide scientific
advice to LINZ on identification of significant apparent values on pastoral land
in the required Conservation Resources Report and when asked.
Some observers and participants see DOC as advocating for "the public
interest."298  But that view is predicated on the assumption that conservation
and recreation comprise the public interest in its totality.  Not wishing to define
such a potentially treacherous term as the “public interest,” this chapter
instead examines the “Crown interest,” as defined in the goals of the land
reform governing statute:299 1) promote ecologically sustainable management
of pastoral land; 2) protect significant inherent values of conservation,
recreation, heritage, and landscape, "preferably" via Crown ownership; 3)
facilitate diversification of land use through freeholding pastoral lease land
with potential for economic production; and 4) facilitate recreation access to
high country.300
These goals are much broader than DOC's goals of preservation and
providing recreation opportunities.  Crown goal number three is not covered
by DOC goals, and number one is only marginally.301  Further, if we expand
our definition of Crown goals to include data sources such as cabinet papers,
policy documents published by LINZ, and interviews with LINZ officials, two
more goals emerge: 1) getting a fair financial return for assets sold in land
tenure review; 2) creating an "economically viable unit" of freehold land for the
farmer coming out of land tenure reform.  DOC's advocacy role covers neither
                                                                                                                            
and safeguarding the options of future generations.”  In other words, conservation comprises
preservation of values and provision of recreation opportunities and access.
297 The Conservation Act  §6(b)
298 Fish and Game representative, Forest and Bird staff, Forest and Bird volunteer
299 however ambiguous, value-laden, and potentially conflictual they may be (see
chapter 3).
300 paraphrased from CPLA §24
301 The Resource Management Act of 1991 recognizes DOC as an advocacy group,
free to lobby on behalf of conservation.  Hence it may submit opinions on proposals to
develop or otherwise change management patterns on private land.  Under the Biosecurity
Act of 1993, DOC has authority to control potential bioinvasions (weeds and pests) on private
land and charge the owner.  But within the context of land tenure reform, DOC's emphasis is
on the future conservation land, not the future management of freehold land.
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of these two additional Crown goals.  While DOC advocates for conservation
and recreation, the agency's goals and interest are far narrower than the
Crown's, as defined by the CPLA, policy documents, and interviews.  DOC
lacks the legal mandate to advocate for diversification of land use, financial
return to the Crown, and economic viability of the future freehold block.  Put
simply, these Crown goals are outside the purview of DOC.
Further, DOC has less bargaining power than LINZ.  LINZ represents the
Crown's interest in, and title to, the pastoral estate.302  As such, the Crown can
withdraw from land tenure reform at any time, while DOC cannot.  LINZ has
veto power, while DOC does not.  LINZ is the "locus of power,"303 leaving DOC
at a weaker arguing stance as DOC does not own the land and does not run
the process.304  The CPLA requires the Commissioner to ask for DOC's
advice, but does not require him to heed the advice.305
There are varying reports of DOC's leverage in the land tenure reform
process.  A lessee and former president of the High Country Committee of
Federated Farmers estimates that DOC's actual influence exceeds
expectations based on the agency's lack of property rights in the pastoral
estate and its official role as adviser.306  By contrast, an observer and
landscape advocate opines that DOC's lack of leverage is reflected in the
results.307
According to Fraser (2001), the most powerful bargaining chip in
negotiation is the ability to walk away, or veto power.  As vested interests with
compensable property rights, both the lessee and the Crown can veto any
deal at any time.  DOC cannot.  As such, consultation with the lessee is very
                                           
302 Commissioner of Crown Lands, "Tenure Review 'Consultation'."
303 FMC representative
304 DOC tenure reform manager, Canterbury Conservancy (Christchurch)
305 Commissioner of Crown Lands; Manger of Crown Property Management; DOC
tenure reform manager, Canterbury Conservancy (Christchurch); Forest and Bird staff
306 this lessee distinguishes sharply between DOC's role as adviser and LINZ's role
as decision-maker.  "DOC is an interested party, but also a consultant.  But at the end of the
day, LINZ says deal or no deal.  It's not DOC."
307According to a landscape advocate, DOC receives advice from professionals and
advocacy groups on how much land should be protected for conservation.  From the initial
advice, to DOC advice to LINZ, through to the final result, "very rarely does the process
produce more conservation land.  It just gets worse."  If DOC had enjoyed more power in the
process, this observer posits that more land would be reserved for conservation.
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different from consultation with DOC.  "The farmer has the ultimate right of
veto, and none of the other parties has the right of veto.  LINZ has the right of
veto, but it is the party doing the consulting, not being consulted."308  In other
words, as LINZ is the self-proclaimed neutral arbitrator of consultations, it is
less likely to exercise its veto power than if it were to assert an advocacy role.
Result of Dichotomy:  No one sticking up for the Crown
DOC advocates for its interest – recreation, conservation, and
landscape.  But it has limited bargaining power, as it has neither a vested
property right nor veto power.
LINZ has both a vested interest and veto power.  But LINZ is running the
process as a self-proclaimed neutral referee.  An agency cannot be neutral at
the same time as it advocates for the Crown's interest.  Instead of exercising
its veto power and its property right,309 LINZ is the "fair umpire."  When writing
the authorizing statute for land tenure reform, legislators envisioned this
referee role.  But giving the so-called neutral role of judge and process
administration to the same entity that represents the Crown's property right
ensures that one of these roles will suffer.
“Neutral" administration of the process, (regardless of whether neutrality
actually exists) is different from the more political task of advocating for the
Crown interest.  LINZ is favouring the administration side, emphasizing its
goal to be the "neutral," "unbiased," "fair," and "objective" "umpire."310  As
LINZ cannot simultaneously act neutrally and advocate, it abdicates its rights
and responsibilities to advocate for the Crown's property interest.  Hence
choosing the administrative side of the dichotomy to the exclusion of politics is
leading to a situation in which no one is sticking up the Crown.
Discussion
In sum, case law directs the agency to enter consultation with no
preconceived decision, to listen with an open mind to all parties, and to
amalgamate all the views into a decision which does not favour one interest
                                           
308 A LINZ contractor
309 according to the manager of Crown Property Management, the Commissioner has
threatened an outright veto once in 67 deals.
310 These are terms repeated in interviews with the Commissioner, Manager of Crown
property management, and the tenure review manager in Christchurch, as well as several
observers and participants.
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over another.  The problem is that the Crown itself is an interest.  And LINZ’s
dual role of neutral referee and representative of the Crown interest effectively
neutralizes the Crown interest.  This neutrality leaves no one to advocate for
the Crown, and tips the scales of the decision heavily towards the farmers.
If land tenure reform were a process of negotiation instead of
consultation, a diagram of it would look as follows:311
But as it is a consultation, not a negotiation, with the Crown as referee, the
process instead looks like this:
An observer might be tempted to put DOC opposite the lessee in the decision-
making:
Yet DOC is not a vested interest as are the Crown and the lessee.  So DOC
wields less power, and advocates for a narrower agenda than that
encompassed by the Crown interest as defined by the governing statute.  So
the diagram looks more as such:
                                           
311 I thank Jean McFarlane for translating my incomprehensible hand-waving into the
teeter-totter metaphor.
Crown lessee
DOC lessee
Crown
lessee
Crown
DOC lessee
Crown
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LINZ neutrality leads to a lack of advocacy for the Crown, which in turn
leads to the farmer advocating and the Crown agent listening with an open
mind.  Ultimately this produces a result that, on its face, appears biased
towards the lessee.  This result engenders the very producer capture that
public choice and the NZ model of public administration seek to avoid.
                
The concept of administrative neutrality takes root in the politics-
administration dichotomy. 312  The dichotomy has been configured and
reconfigured countless times in the literature – its most recent revitalisation in
the policy-operations split of managerialism.313  I am not suggesting another
reconfiguration.  But these findings certainly raise questions about the goals
and administrative tools that are common to the split and the dichotomy.  This
research finds that the avowedly mythical tool of administrative neutrality does
not yield the neutral, or uncaptured, results as hoped.  Quite the opposite in
fact.  This case out-captures agency capture.
Re-examination of the dichotomy, the split, and their shared goals and
tools yields contradictory conclusions.  Firstly, it becomes clear that the tools
employed (so-called administrative neutrality enforced via a policy-operations
split) to achieve a goal (avoiding capture) are fundamentally flawed.  The
results of land tenure reform appear strongly biased towards the agricultural
production interest, and look exactly the opposite of the sought-after
uncaptured results.  But secondly, it becomes clear that these tools are
inconsistently and incompletely applied, regardless of their adequacy. 314
                                           
312 See generally Campbell and Peters, "The Politics/Administration Dichotomy:
Death or Merely Change.", B. Guy Peters, The Politics of Bureaucracy, 5th ed. (London:
Routledge, 2002).
313  See especially Boston et al., eds., Reshaping the State : New Zealand's
Bureaucratic Revolution.
314 This paper does not suggest throwing the whole notion of an independent civil
service out the window in favor of the old spoils system.  Indeed some attempts at structural
separation between political advocacy and administration can be positive.  Perhaps the land
lessee
Crown
DOC
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Are the tools inadequate, or were they misapplied in this case?  It
appears that both of the above are true, especially the latter.  While scholars
have long deemed the dichotomy inadequate, impractical, and indeed
impossible, it remains the administrative tool of choice in many cases of policy
implementation, including this one.315  If the dichotomy is going to be used in
any form, policy-makers and administrators should at least apply it
consistently.
In this case, the process places too much faith in the neutrality of
administrators, and on the robustness of the policy-operations split within
LINZ.  LINZ represents the Crown’s vested interest, but is also expected to act
as the neutral umpire.  It cannot simultaneously act neutrally and represent
the Crown’s interest in the land.
  If designers of the statute governing land reform envisioned the
administrators of the process as so-called neutral referees, then legislators
cannot expect the same administrators to represent and stick up for the
Crown’s vested interest in the land.  Since the process is based on the
administrative neutrality born of a strict separation of politics and
administration, albeit a mythical split, administrators and contractors who are
striving to be neutral cannot represent the Crown’s interest.
Analysis to this point has painted government officials as rather passive
participants, and their lack of advocacy for the Crown interest as merely a by-
product of their perceived mandate to maintain neutrality.  It is worth
considering that officials and their trusted dichotomy (or split) play a more
active role, and that the dichotomy might survive because it serves the goals
of both legislators and administrators.  Without delving into the realm of
conspiracy accusations, the dichotomy offers a cloak of cold, technical
                                                                                                                            
tenure reform process ought to have followed the dichotomy a bit more closely, by vesting
authority over the Crown’s interest in the land in a separate entity from the agency in charge
of administering the redistribution process.  This configuration would assign DOC to advocate
for conservation and recreation, the lessee to advocate for the lessee, LINZ to advocate for
the Crown, and an independent tribunal (perhaps the existing Land Valuation Tribunal, for
example) to make the decision. This configuration would in fact give more credence to the
dichotomy, by distributing the political advocacy and neutral arbitration roles to separate
entities.  I do not suggest that the independent tribunal would be either neutral or objective,
but neither would it have a dual mandate of neutrality and representing the Crown interest.
315 Peters, The Politics of Bureaucracy.
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neutrality behind which agencies can hide, when they don the cloak of
neutrality in order to divert public attention away from borderline nonsensical
policy results.  According to Peters, the dichotomy’s usefulness to both
administrators and politicians is an important reason for its survival for over a
century despite its widely acknowledged fallacy.
[It is worth] noting the survival of the ancient proverb of public life that
politics and administration are separate enterprises and that such a
separation is valid both in the analysis … [and] in the actual conduct of
public business.  Although any number of authors has attempted to lay
this proverb to rest, it has displayed amazing powers of survival and
reappears in any number of settings in any number of political
systems.316 … What does the artificial separation of these two activities
assume to do that makes the survival of this ‘‘useful fiction’’ so desirable
for both sets of actors? For administrators, this presumed separation of
administration and politics allows them to … engage in policy making —
presumably using technical or legal criteria for their decisions — without
the interference of political actors who might otherwise recognize political
or ideological influences on policies …317  Thus, the actions of
administrators may be regarded by politicians, the public and even by
themselves as the result of the simple application of rational, legal, or
technical criteria to questions of policy. This apparent professional
detachment may make otherwise unacceptable decisions more palatable
to the public.318
But this analysis will not go too far down the road of conspiracy theory as
statute, case law, the Westminster administrative tradition, and the dominant
New Public Management model all push LINZ towards its stated position of
neutrality, at least indirectly.
On the topic of caution, the strengths, weaknesses, and necessities of
the research design of this study bear examination.  Reliance on a research
design at the macro scale means that analysis might ignore important details
on the micro scale; and with financial data only available on a national and
annual scale, local details of the land redistribution have been omitted.  For
instance, the difference between the land designation categories (freehold
                                           
316 Campbell and Peters, "The Politics/Administration Dichotomy: Death or Merely
Change."
317 Richard Rose, "Giving Direction to Permanent Officials," in Bureaucracy and
Public Choice, ed. Jan-Erik Lane (London: Sage, 1987).
318 Peters, The Politics of Bureaucracy, p. 182-83. citing Morris P. Fiorina,
"Flagellating the Federal Bureaucracy," Society, no. 20 (1983), Joel F. Handler, Down from
Bureaucracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
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and Crown) is statistically significant,319 but if examined on a smaller scale
local differences emerge to offer alternate explanations for the results.  For
example, many leaseholders entered NZ’s Protected Natural Areas
Programme in the 1980s, relinquishing claims to portions of their leases to
benefit conservation.  Having already shifted some land into conservation
reserves, those leases will yield fewer hectares for conservation in the land
tenure reform process than leases that never entered the program.
Another possible limitation of the research design is the naïve optimism
afforded to the interview data.  Most notably, when LINZ officials said they are
objective, apolitical, and neutral, this research does not measure their veracity
and hence does not doubt them.  There is of course substantial reason to
doubt them, but these doubts do not affect the research findings.
Most broadly, we live in a post-quantum world in which objectivity
simply does not exist,320 even for laboratory physicists and much less for
property rights redistribution administrators.  More specifically, research
reveals that consultation processes often live up neither to their ideals nor to
their legal mandates.321
But these findings do not depend on whether LINZ officials and
contractors are successful in their quest to be neutral and objective.  Even
striving for neutrality abdicates responsibility to represent the Crown’s interest
in the pastoral estate.  This research does not reveal and cannot know first-
hand what goes on in closed consultations.322  But striving to achieve a
perceived mandate of neutrality all but guarantees that LINZ officials will not
                                           
319 A two-tailed t-test of absolute numbers in land results produces a p-value of
0.0075.  And the test of the two sets of proportions is far more significant.
320 Among other things, both quantum and relativity theory revealed that there is no
such thing as objectivity.  Merely taking the measurement of an event changes the event itself
(in the quantum case, collapsing the light wave into a particle).  Hence the observer is part of
the event, not an objective bystander.  For more, see P. C. W. Davies, The Ghost in the Atom
: A Discussion of the Mysteries of Quantum Physics (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1986).
321 Bronwyn Mary Hayward, "Effective Citizen Engagement and Social Learning in
Environmental Policy: The New Zealand Experience," Annual Meeting of the American
Political Science Association 2005 (2005).
322 In closed processes with results that are only partially publicly available, there
might be opportunity for corruption.  But this research design neither looks for, nor suggests
corruption.  It just takes government officials at their word and examines the picture they
paint.
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advocate for the Crown, as that is not their perceived role.  Just trying for
neutrality precludes effective advocacy for the Crown interest, and tips the
scales in favour of the lessees.
Conclusion
Land reform suffers from an inconsistent and incomplete application of
a mythical administrative tool, the politics-administration dichotomy, which
seeks to avoid agency capture in policy implementation.  The tool itself is
flawed, and its application here is not complete.  LINZ is relying on a carefully
crafted policy-operations split within the agency, but then assigning both the
political advocacy and the so-called neutral administration to the operations
side of the split.  This neutralizes the Crown’s vested interest in the land, and
tilts the results toward the farmers.  Neutrality, the dichotomy, and the policy-
operations split are administrative figments of the 19th century scholarly
imagination.  But if applied at all, they must be applied throughout.  In this
case, the jobs of advocating for the Crown’s interest and administering the
process should be vested in different agencies.
Neutrality is a mythical and impossible goal.  Eliminating politics from
decision process of distributing valuable resources is ludicrous, futile, and in
this case dangerous.  It is ludicrous and futile because such decisions are
inherently political.  No matter how competent, morally upstanding, and well-
meaning LINZ officials and contractors are, an attempt to eliminate politics will
never succeed.  Everything is political, especially land allocation.  It is
dangerous, because it has backfired.  Instead of delivering the hoped-for
unbiased result, it has out-captured capture theories of interest group politics.
This is not an indictment of LINZ.  I have no data to support a claim that
the agency’s attempts at neutrality are anything but honest, competent, and
well-intentioned.  But placing “neutral” and “vested interest” in the same task
description will not work.  One will lose.  In this case, it is the vested interest,
the Crown, and ultimately the NZ people.
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Figure 7: Public recreation access to new conservation reserve across 1.6 km of newly
freeholded land.  Down a long, bumpy dirt road, through two herds of sheep,
somewhere in Central Otago, NZ.
Figure 8: New conservation land resulting from land tenure reform.  Lindis Pass
Conservation Area, August 2005.
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Figure 9: Designation Plan for the "Lindis Group" of pastoral leases.
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